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This E-book is the result of a conference on “The Gulf Region, Domestic 
Dynamics and Global-Regional Perspectives. Implications for the European 
Union”, hosted by the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies in spring 
2015. The Scientific Director for the conference was Amb. Luigi Narbone, an EU 
Institutional Fellow at the EUI for the academic year 2014/15. As part of its global 
governance programme, the Schuman Centre was delighted to host a conference 
on this important region, the Gulf. Regionalism is a growing phenomenon in 
global politics and understanding the role and dynamics of different regions in 
necessary to understand the complexity and interdependence of our world. The 
Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) consisting of six monarchies is a regional and 
global actor. 
The Gulf has come to assume a growing significance in regional politics and 
the Gulf states have a major influence on events within and beyond the region. 
Although not large states, these countries have considerable financial clout arising 
from the role as major oil producers and have strong preferences about regional 
order. The objective of the conference was twofold, (a) to explore domestic and 
international drivers of change and (b) to analyse the role of the Gulf in the 
geopolitics of the Middle East in the context of the Arab Spring and its aftermath. 
The Gulf states are key actors in the MENA region and are competitors to Iran 
whom they regard with deep mistrust. The conference certainly achieved its 
objective; the chapters capture the range and diversity of the vibrant intellectual 
debate that took place during the course of the conference. For all Gulf states and 
the region, there are major challenges to be faced to do with the sustainability of 
their economic model and the security threats arising from failed states and the 
role of Iran in Yemen, Iraq and Syria. They must manage internal reform while 
at the same time addressing the exigencies of an unstable environment. 
The role of the Gulf and instability in the MENA region poses challenges too 
for the European Union. To date EU cooperation with the Gulf region has been 
minimalist. Continuing this approach is unwise given the importance of the 
Gulf and Europe’s interest in restoring a degree of order to this troubled part 
of the world. Luigi Narbone is to be congratulated for organizing an excellent 
conference and ensuring that the conference contributions are captured in this 
E-book. The Schuman Centre is fully committed to research and policy dialogue 
on this part of Europe’s neighbourhood. 
Brigid Laffan
Director
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INTRODUCTION
Luigi Narbone and Martin Lestra
When in late 2014 the Robert Schuman Centre 
for Advanced Studies of the European University 
Institute decided to organize a conference on ‘The 
Gulf region: domestic dynamics and global-
regional perspectives. Implications for the EU’ 
(Florence, Italy, 20-21 April 2015), the interest of 
researchers and policy-makers in the Gulf was 
already high. 
A decade of positive developments had changed 
the status of the region. The Gulf was now broadly 
recognized as one of the emerging regions of the 
world. In addition to their continuing prominence 
as oil and gas producers and exporters – made 
even more significant by a long cycle of high 
oil prices which had lasted well into 2014 – the 
Gulf countries had been experiencing important 
transformations brought about by years of booming 
economies, huge infrastructure investments, 
futuristic modernization of cities and attempts to 
move away from over-reliance on hydrocarbon 
production by making the region a hub for global 
transportation and financial services. Sustained 
growth had translated into the Gulf countries 
playing expanding international and investor 
roles worldwide; this had been accompanied by 
a gradual shift towards Asia in international and 
trade relations. 
Interest in the Gulf had further grown during the 
Arab Spring, when many questions were raised 
about the impact on the political sustainability 
of the authoritarian Gulf monarchies of the 
revolutionary wave that swept over the Arab 
world. Attention on the Gulf countries increased 
even more in the aftermath of the uprising, when 
it became apparent that they had emerged as 
powerful regional players. In the face of regional 
challenges, they started to change their long-
standing foreign policy patterns and become more 
assertive in the numerous crises of the MENA 
region and more willing to shape the political 
transition in many countries.       
While there was consensus on the fact that the 
Gulf region had become an increasingly important 
actor, many questions about the future of these 
monarchies and their role in the global and regional 
arenas were left unanswered. Is the Gulf economic 
model sustainable in times of low oil prices? And 
what would the impact be of diminishing growth 
on political stability? How do structural factors 
such as demography and continuing dependence 
on oil and gas revenues limit the Gulf countries’ 
capacity to maintain sustained economic growth? 
What does the pivot towards Asia entail for 
the security of Gulf countries? How does the 
geo-political confrontation with Iran shape the 
deepening sectarianism? How successful can they 
be at insulating themselves from instability and 
projecting their interests in the Middle East? How 
united are the Gulf countries in their perceptions 
of and reactions against the external Iranian 
threat? What are the bases and consequences of 
the Gulf countries’ new interventionism?
The conference was conceived as an attempt to 
understand the different dynamics at play in 
the region. It had the ambition to try to connect 
different levels, from the local to the transnational 
to the global, and to look at the unexplored links 
between domestic, regional and external factors. 
The conference speakers,  academics, policy-
makers, journalists and financial experts all 
brought different perspectives to the discussion.
Three key issues were raised. First, the Arab Spring 
and its consequences in the broader MENA region 
have put the changes in the Gulf polities to the 
test. Exploration of structural issues such as the 
Gulf ’s fiscal, immigration and (non-) integration 
policies created the background to often 
overlooked domestic challenges that have regional 
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and international implications. The discussion 
went beyond assessment of the stability of the 
GCC states during and after the Arab Spring. The 
structural aspects examined helped qualify the 
paradigm of rentier states, which does not fully 
capture the dynamics at work in this region.
Second, the conference looked at the various 
components of what is now commonly called the 
Gulf states’ ‘new interventionism’. With the cases of 
Yemen and Iran, it soon became clear that different 
national interests and long-term foreign policy 
goals shape the way they act in the new context. 
But it was also clear that renewed geo-political 
confrontations have triggered new mechanisms 
which might exacerbate the religious dimension 
of the divide, thus making dialogue and the search 
for political solutions to the conflicts in the region 
more difficult.
Finally, the conference enabled academics and 
policy-makers to outline the challenges facing EU-
GCC relations in the post-Arab Spring context. 
Within the framework of the Gulf ’s swing towards 
Asia and the declining influence of traditional 
powers in the region (the USA in particular), the 
Gulf and European perspectives explored during 
the conference cast light on the incentives to 
deepen the relationship between the two regional 
blocks. 
These common threads ran throughout the 
conference. They are also present in the written 
contributions contained in this book. The various 
chapters offer substantive and concise insights 
into what makes the Gulf countries and the GCC 
increasingly pivotal actors in international and 
regional politics. 
In the first chapter, Steffen Hertog gives a detailed 
account of the fiscal pressure facing the Gulf states 
in the age of low oil prices. Drawing lessons from 
the 1990s, he looks at the way austerity will affect 
costly state-driven economic growth and at the 
possible consequences for both the Gulf countries’ 
domestic dynamics and foreign policy. 
In the second chapter, Philippe Fargues addresses 
demography and migration policies in the Gulf as 
key determinants of its economic development. 
He analyses the shortcomings of the current 
migration policies and the factors which may in 
the long term destabilize the ‘dual society’ model. 
In the third chapter, Abdullah Baabood points to 
the increasing economic and political ties between 
the Gulf and Asian countries in the framework 
of a diminishing US presence, and questions the 
role of the latter as guarantor of security for the 
Gulf countries. He examines the potential impact 
of the Gulf ’s pivot towards Asia on EU-GCC 
relations and highlights how they have been to the 
detriment of the EU.
In the fourth chapter, Olivier Roy addresses 
the ongoing Sunni-Shia confrontation, now 
viewed in the West as a religious clash, through 
a genealogical approach. His geopolitical reading 
of this divide points to the role of Saudi Arabia as 
leader of the Sunni side and draws conclusions on 
how the growing use of the religious dimension 
might exacerbate the confrontation between the 
two camps. 
In the fifth chapter, Toby Matthiesen unfolds 
the rise of transnational sectarian identities as 
a new fundamental factor in the politics of the 
Middle East and explains how regional conflicts 
have politicised such identities. The regional 
rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, both of 
which use sectarian identities to further their 
geopolitical goals, has been a crucial element in 
this development.
In a complementary perspective on the external 
relations of the Gulf states, in the sixth chapter 
Marc Valeri makes sense of the diverging views 
held by different Gulf countries on the relationship 
with Iran. He looks at how the various national 
interests shape different attitudes in dealing with 
the neighbour across the Gulf and at how they are 
reconciled in a difficult balance within the GCC.    
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In the seventh chapter, while recognizing the 
novelty of intervening militarily in Yemen, 
Abubakr Al-Shamahi traces the roots of the Saudi-
led operation back to a long-standing Saudi policy 
vis-à-vis the country. He challenges the idea that 
Saudi Arabia’s military endeavour represents a 
major shift and claims that controlled instability 
in Yemen has been a Saudi foreign policy goal for 
several decades.
In chapter eight, Dominique Thomas unveils the 
internal dynamics of jihadi groups in the Gulf 
region. His nuanced account of jihadi strategies 
– notably the transnational versus the territorial 
– sheds lights on the divisions existing within 
the jihadi galaxy and the ensuing rivalries and 
coalition patterns, notably between Al Qaeda, 
Ansar al-Sharia and ISIS.
Finally, Luigi Narbone draws some conclusions 
about recent domestic, regional and international 
developments in the Gulf countries and their 
implications for the EU and the EU-GCC 
relationship.
SECTION 1  
BEYOND THE ARAB SPRING.  
GULF COUNTRIES' DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL  
DRIVERS OF CHANGE.
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THE GCC ECONOMIC MODEL 
IN AN AGE OF AUSTERITY
Steffen Hertog,  
Associate Professor,  
London School of Economics
INTRODUCTION
As oil prices have more than halved since summer 
2014, all OPEC countries are revising their 
government spending policies. While countries 
like Iran and Venezuela face an imminent fiscal 
crisis, the short-term ramifications for the Arabian 
Peninsula’s oil monarchies are less dramatic. In the 
long run, however, their very high dependence 
on oil income poses a more fundamental 
development challenge than for almost any other 
hydrocarbon exporter. It is likely that new fiscal 
constraints will demonstrate deep limitations 
of the “Gulf economic model”, revealing the fact 
that – all diversification attempts notwithstanding 
– most economic activities in the region remain 
dependent on state spending.
In trying to build mid- to long-term fiscal and 
economic scenarios for the Gulf, it is useful to 
investigate the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
reactions to a previous period of low oil prices in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Drawing on this precedent, 
the present chapter will argue that henceforth GCC 
governments are likely to engage in less costly 
policy experimentation through large investment 
projects and will downsize or wind down some 
projects that are already in the pipeline. The focus 
of policy will gradually shift towards more painful 
but necessary reforms, such as subsidy reductions 
and, potentially, a broadening of taxation – 
although it is likely that such reforms will be too 
little too late to stave off a fiscal crisis in the long 
run. While capital spending will decline, current 
government spending on salaries and transfers 
will continue to rise for the foreseeable future, 
resulting in ongoing if more modest growth of 
local consumer markets. 
THE CURRENT FISCAL SITUATION
The large hydrocarbon producers of the GCC 
– Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE –
recorded substantial fiscal surpluses for 2014, 
benefiting from high oil prices earlier in the 
year. Bahrain alone incurred a substantial deficit. 
For all of them, however, the fiscal outlook has 
become cloudier, not only because of reduced oil 
prices but also because their fiscal needs to just 
operate their economies at the current level have 
drastically increased over recent years. The oil 
prices at which GCC government budgets break 
even have on average increased more than three 
times since the early 2000s. According to IMF 
estimates, they now lie above current oil prices for 
Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia and (although only 
slightly) the UAE (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: 2014 and 2015 breakeven oil prices for 
the GCC
Source: IMF (January 2015), with adjustment for additional 
spending announcements by Saudi Arabia in late January
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This means that for all the countries bar Kuwait 
and Qatar deficits are expected for 2015. These 
will be substantial for the lower-income countries: 
Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Estimated 2014 and 2015 fiscal 
surpluses/deficits (% GDP)
Source: IMF (January 2015), with adjustment for additional 
spending announcements by Saudi Arabia in late January 
(Jadwa April 2015)
The fiscal room of manoeuvre for Bahrain and 
Oman, both of which have only small overseas 
reserves, is particularly restricted. Bahrain in 
particular already has a government debt of more 
than 40% of GDP. It has already engaged in some 
austerity measures and is the only country in 
which estimated 2013 spending lay below that for 
2012.
The other four GCC countries have substantial 
overseas reserves that are equivalent to several 
annual budgets, giving them considerable leeway 
to run deficits without incurring net debt. Figure 
3 shows the absolute estimated size of Gulf 
sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) together with 
their size relative to (expected) 2015 government 
expenditure.
Figure 3: Size of Gulf SWFs
 
Sources: SWF Institute, IMF
Policy-makers even in the high-reserve countries 
are well aware, however, that the rapid spending 
growth of the last decade cannot continue. It could 
lead to a depletion of financial reserves within as 
little as half a decade in the case of Saudi Arabia 
and between one and two decades in the other 
cases. All the signals are that spending growth will 
strongly slow down in the coming years.
THE PRECEDENT OF THE AUSTERE 1990S
To understand what the shape and economic 
consequences of less expansive fiscal policies 
will be, it is useful to study the experience of the 
last period of low oil prices and fiscal austerity, 
which lasted from the mid-1980s to the late 
1990s. The general pattern across the region was 
that when governments had to make cuts, project 
and infrastructure spending was the first victim, 
while current spending on government salaries 
and public services like education and health was 
protected as long as possible. Figure 4 shows that 
Saudi Arabia almost completely abandoned capital 
expenditure in the 1990s, leading to a decay of 
public infrastructure that was only ameliorated 
during the 2000s oil boom, when capital spending 
increased again.
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Figure 4: Shares of current and capital 
expenditure in Saudi government spending
Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency
GCC government subsidy cuts in the 1990s 
predominantly affected large and industrial 
consumers. Budgets for industrial loans were 
squeezed and utility tariffs for industrial users 
increased, while subsidies for households 
remained protected, or at least tariff increases 
only targeted larger (and richer) households 
with higher consumption levels. In a sign of the 
times, the Saudi national airline increased ticket 
prices for business and first class but protected 
the subsidized prices for economy travellers. 
Education and health services for nationals across 
the region remained free and state employment 
was not only protected but continued to grow.
Together with the reduced provision of industrial 
infrastructure, reduced state support made life 
for manufacturers difficult. However, the worst 
affected sector was construction, which had 
previously relied on state projects during the 
1970s and early 1980s oil boom. Tens of thousands 
of contractors went bankrupt in the 1980s and 
1990s. Reduced capital spending meant reduced 
investment in state-driven diversification policies 
in infrastructure, heavy industry and logistics 
etc. that had characterized the Gulf economic 
model during the last decade or so. As benefits for 
households were protected as much as possible, 
firms in the private consumer economy suffered 
the least.
The austerity of the 1990s showed that mass 
entitlements to employment, services and 
subsidies are more politically sensitive than other 
forms of spending, reflecting a distributional 
commitment among GCC rulers that is stronger 
than in most other oil states – but which also 
limits policy autonomy in hard times.
The basic parameters of the GCC political economy 
have not shifted since the 1990s. If anything, 
popular entitlements have become stronger and 
citizens have become better organized at claiming 
them. Unlike political dissent, public and private 
protests in favour of salary increases and state 
employment or against subsidy reforms are 
generally tolerated and often effective. By contrast, 
private business has come under increasing public 
pressure in recent years for failing to provide 
sufficient jobs for nationals, once again making it 
likely to be the first target of fiscal trimming. 
NEW FISCAL PATTERNS
Even if oil prices should recover, it is clear that 
spending growth will slow down in the coming 
years across the region and is likely to be followed 
by spending cuts in the mid-term. Even just a 
plateauing of spending will mean falling capital 
expenditure, as the upward trend of current 
spending is set to continue for the time being with 
national working-age populations continuing to 
grow and because occasional local and regional 
political crises could lead to a further ratcheting 
up of patronage spending. Now, already, current 
spending on salaries in particular is quite high 
in the GCC, reaching 45% of total government 
spending in the Saudi case, compared to typical 
shares in OECD countries between 15 and 30% 
(Figure 5).
The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challenges8
Figure 5: Saudi public salary spending
Source: calculated from SAMA annual reports, statistical 
yearbooks
As a result of this shift, some large-scale projects 
might be downsized or stopped, including some of 
the infrastructure planned for the 2022 World Cup 
in Qatar. In the long run, there is a danger of even 
essential infrastructure spending being squeezed, 
as was the case in the less wealthy GCC countries 
in the 1990s, which in turn could compromise 
industrial diversification.
SLOWING GROWTH
Economic growth in the GCC remains closely 
correlated with state spending. While this is also 
the case in other economies, the linkage works 
differently in the Gulf. In tax-based economies, 
taxation of the private economy finances state 
expenditure, which in turn has an impact on the 
shape and level of private economic activity. In the 
GCC, by contrast, business is only taxed lightly 
or not at all. While state spending thus affects 
growth in the private economy, it is hydrocarbon 
rents, not local business activity, which set 
constraints on government spending. The close 
correlation between state expenditure and private 
economic growth therefore reflects the one-sided 
dependence of private business.
As a global rule of thumb, government spending 
typically constitutes about one third of GDP 
(somewhat less in less developed countries 
and more in more developed ones). As Figure 
6 shows, with the exception of Bahrain, the 
share of government spending in non-oil GDP 
is considerably higher in the GCC region and 
has generally increased during the boom of the 
last decade. Closely related to this, the ratio of 
government to private consumption is 2-4 times 
higher in the GCC than in the rest of the world. 
In fact, even private consumer demand is mostly 
state-driven, as most national households derive 
their income from state employment, while 
foreigners employed in the private sector remit 
a larger share of their (generally lower) incomes 
abroad.
Figure 6: Share of government spending in non-
oil GDP
Source: calculated from IMF and World Bank Development 
Indicators data
All this means that the impact of slower or 
declining state spending on local economic 
activity will be particularly pronounced. In the 
short run, this will mostly affect economic sectors 
depending on state project spending, but in the 
mid-term even current spending will plateau and 
potentially decline, meaning stagnation in the 
consumer economy too.
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FISCAL CONSTRAINTS AS A POLICY 
OPPORTUNITY 
The looming shadow of a crisis can focus minds 
and lead to painful but necessary decisions – as it 
did in parts of the region in the 1990s. In fact, there 
are some signs of a renewed reform debate. Even 
in Kuwait, generally the region’s reform laggard, 
the government is now openly debating the need 
for fiscal and subsidy reforms in the face of lower 
oil prices. In practice, however, it is unlikely that 
the adjustment will be sufficient to tackle the long-
term fiscal challenge.
Subsidy reform
One necessary reform that is likely to happen in the 
coming years is an adjustment of domestic energy 
prices. These are uniquely low in comparison 
with global levels, which leads to large-scale 
over-consumption and imposes increasing fiscal 
costs as the production of oil and particularly 
gas is becoming more expensive in the region. 
Past experience and the current policy debate 
suggest that the first targets of price adjustments 
will be industrial consumers, followed by richer 
households. Electricity and fuel price reforms are 
actively being debated in Bahrain, Kuwait and 
Oman, while Abu Dhabi increased electricity and 
water tariffs in November 2014, although foreign 
residents bore the brunt of the increases.
Figure 7: Estimated energy subsidies in the GCC 
countries as share of GDP (2011)
Source: IMF
GCC governments are also likely to consider 
sell-offs of non-essential public assets to alleviate 
deficits, an option that is already being publicly 
discussed in Oman. There are limits to this strategy, 
however, as stock market valuations are likely to be 
depressed at exactly the time of fiscal stagnation 
when revenue from privatization would be needed 
the most. Moreover, public companies in aviation, 
heavy industry, telecoms and banking have been 
core tools in the GCC’s diversification strategy 
and the rulers are unlikely to easily abandon the 
commanding heights of strategic sectors.
Finally, as GCC governments will be increasingly 
unable to accommodate young nationals in the 
public sector, they will increase the pressure on 
the private sector to employ citizens. Such policies, 
however, remain difficult to implement as long 
as the local labour markets remain open to low-
cost immigrant labour – a core plank of the GCC 
economic model. 
Other painful reforms?
In the long run, it is obvious that the GCC 
countries need to create a non-hydrocarbon fiscal 
base – an issue that the IMF has been pressing 
for more than three decades. Taxation remains 
political anathema, however, and none of the 
GCC governments managed to introduce any 
substantial tax reforms during the last phase of 
austerity. A plan for a GCC-wide value added tax 
remains on ice.
A modern tax system takes a long time to build. 
Moreover, as the state dependence of the GCC 
economies remains high, it is not clear how 
large the private sector’s autonomous capacity to 
generate revenue really is. Equally important, the 
introduction of broad-based taxes is likely to give 
rise to political claims on the part of business and 
the general population that the GCC rulers are 
likely to try to avoid until it is too late.
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CONCLUSIONS: IMPACT ON THE “GCC 
ECONOMIC MODEL”
The GCC fiscal situation does not pose an 
immediate stability threat. The richer countries 
are comfortable for at least another decade even 
with lower prices, and will be able to prevent 
a politically undesirable economic collapse in 
Bahrain and Oman through grants and loans. 
Even when their overseas reserves are run down, 
the governments will still be able to issue debt, 
which they can strong-arm local banks to accept.
State spending and economic growth, however, are 
likely to slow down, reducing the policy flexibility 
of GCC regimes – including in the regional realm, 
where chequebook diplomacy will become harder 
to implement. Domestic popular entitlements will 
remain ring-fenced, so unless oil prices recover 
substantially there is a risk of economic and policy 
stagnation on the domestic front.
Much of the diversification in the GCC since the 
early 2000s has been state-driven, often by state-
owned enterprises reliant on sovereign guarantees 
and capital injections and supported by heavy state 
infrastructure spending. This “diversification” 
strategy has ironically deepened the state 
dependence of local economies in many sectors. 
These capital-intensive diversification policies are 
likely to suffer first in an age of prolonged austerity.
To some extent, this might not be a bad thing, 
as some of the spending on prestige projects in 
places like Qatar and Abu Dhabi has arguably 
been frivolous. There will be less large-scale 
experimentation with sectors like renewable 
energy, semiconductors or aircraft technology. 
There will be less investment in museums, 
world-scale tourism and logistics facilities, while 
investment in heavy industry will be more modest 
and targeted. Reduced capital spending means a 
more modest economic agenda and a stronger 
reliance on local consumer economies – although 
here too privately derived household demand 
remains limited.
At the same time, a period of prolonged austerity 
could lead to a survival of the fittest in which 
diversification is limited to priority sectors that 
are less dependent on continuing large-scale 
state support, including, potentially, international 
aviation, healthcare and local tourism.
For the time being, Dubai is the only GCC economy 
that has found a state-led diversification model 
that is not dependent on continual large capital 
injections from the government. It will probably 
remain the only place with this distinction for a 
long time to come – although even Dubai is likely 
to indirectly suffer from austerity as demand from 
neighbouring markets slows down.
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IMMIGRATION VS. 
POPULATION IN THE GULF
Philippe Fargues,  
Director, Migration Policy Centre, European 
University Institute
INTRODUCTION
“Capital-rich and labour-poor”. This is how 
the curse of the Gulf States was described fifty 
years ago. The world’s largest oil stocks had just 
been discovered under the earth’s most arid and 
depopulated region. With oil internationally 
recognised as the property of the state and not of 
the company that did the pumping, the scarcely 
populated states of the Gulf acquired enormous 
wealth. From the largest and oldest (Saudi 
Arabia) to the tiniest and youngest (Qatar), all 
six Gulf states soon faced income surpluses with 
population shortages, to which they all responded 
by importing labour. In just five decades, the 
Gulf, which for centuries had received only small 
population flows, became the world’s third largest 
receiver of global migrants after the United States 
and the European Union. The way in which 
these nascent nations would incorporate massive 
numbers of newcomers into the workplace but not 
into their societies is a unique feature of the Gulf. 
When strong oil economies emerged in the Gulf 
in the 1960s, Pan-Arabism was still at its height. 
Migration from South Arabia, the Levant and 
the Nile Valley to the Gulf was seen by many in 
the region as a strategic move towards a strong 
integrated Arab Nation. Arab labour mobility 
would bring the human wealth of the Arab world 
together with its financial wealth, and a powerful 
nation would be born. This ideology was reinforced 
by the 1973 Suez Canal War, when OAPEC (the 
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting 
Countries) proclaimed an oil embargo on Israel’s 
allies and oil prices quadrupled. Oil income, and 
with it the demand for migrant labour, soared 
in the Gulf. This is when the reality and rhetoric 
started to part company, as Asians gradually came 
to outnumber Arabs in the Gulf labour markets.1 
The 1990-91 Gulf war following the Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait was to finish off the pan-Arab myth. 
Three million Arab migrants were deported from 
the Arab states where they were employed for the 
simple reason that they were born with the wrong 
citizenship: Egyptians from Iraq, as Egypt was part 
of the coalition against Iraq; Palestinians from 
Kuwait; and Yemenis from Saudi Arabia, because 
the Palestine Liberation Organisation and the 
Yemeni government were supporting Iraq. Since 
then, Arab migration, which was the preferred 
topic of Arab social scientists and conferences in 
the region in the 1980s, has disappeared from the 
academic world. Migrants soon returned to the 
Gulf, and because the vast majority were excluded 
from host citizenship non-citizens came to form 
most of the workforce (from 50 to 90% according 
to the state) and in some cases most of the total 
population (from 36 to 80%).
OPEN LABOUR MARKETS, CLOSED 
SOCIETIES 
The Gulf States share a paradox: non-nationals 
are key actors in their nation-building processes. 
Without them, the Gulf States would not be 
what they are today, neither economically nor 
politically. First, migrants have always been and 
still are instrumental in building these states. 
Endowed with large surpluses of financial capital 
but faced with acute deficits of human capital, 
the Gulf economies resorted to massive labour 
importation. As Figure 1 shows, the entire private 
sector – where most service and good production 
1 A. Kapiszewski, Arab Versus Asian Migrant Workers 
in the GCC Countries, United Nations Expert Group 
Meeting on International Migration and Development 
in the Arab Region, Beirut (15-17 May 2006)
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is concentrated – would simply collapse without 
foreign workers. After all, they represent between 
80% (Bahrain) and 99% (Qatar) of the labour 
force. Nationals are only employed in the public 
sector, mostly in administrative positions.
Fig.1 Percentage of Foreign-Nationals Employed 
by Sector (2013)
Source: Gulf Labour Markets and Migration, http://gulfmi-
gration.eu/ 
In brief, migration was indispensable in 
transforming financial assets into infrastructure 
for the construction of sustainable post-oil 
economies; and into well-being for nationals. 
It made it possible to provide Gulf nationals 
with high standards of living, while at the same 
time allowing them the world’s lowest level of 
economic participation. By turning oil income 
into no-taxation welfare states, migration brought 
legitimacy to Gulf rulers and political stability to 
their regimes.
Second, migrants are not offered opportunities 
to become members of the Gulf host societies. 
They are all guest workers, sometimes, in the case 
of high ranking workers, accompanied by family 
dependents. Their stay can only be temporary 
by law and with few exceptions they cannot 
be granted citizenship in their host country. 
Moreover, all three-D jobs (dangerous, dirty, and 
demeaning) are carried out by migrants. This 
means that there is no national working class that 
might claim a right to protest. If labour conflicts 
happen to break out they are usually solved by 
returning the protesters to their country of origin; 
or the protestors are simply silenced. For example, 
in April 2015 a migrant construction worker fell to 
his death from a building in Ras-Al-Khaimah. His 
Asian fellow-workers protested and cars were set 
on fire. Social media outlets were urged not to give 
publicity to the incident as baseless claims could 
destabilise society. 
To use a phrase I have employed elsewhere 
‘dual societies’ have emerged in the Gulf, with 
separate worlds for nationals and non-nationals.2 
Economically, as we have seen, the nationals have 
the world’s lowest rate of economic activity and are 
concentrated solely in the public sector, while non-
nationals have one of the world’s highest rates of 
activity and take on all the jobs in the private sector. 
Legally, the ‘kafâla’ (sponsorship) system creates a 
barrier as every foreign-national is obliged to have 
a national ‘kafeel’ (sponsor), who levies part of the 
migrant worker’s income. Moreover, jus sanguinis 
confines sons and daughters of migrants born in 
the Gulf to their parents’ non-national status with 
no door into citizenship through naturalisation, 
which is restricted to exceptional case.3 As non-
citizens, migrants and their families are excluded 
from all the economic, social and political rights 
and benefits reserved for citizens. Socially, 
interaction is also extremely limited between the 
two.
Dual societies produce differentiated demographic 
patterns. The population of nationals/citizens 
grows solely through natural increase (determined 
by birth and death rates). The population of 
non-nationals/non-citizens grows as a result 
of two additive processes: the balance between 
new immigration and return migration, and 
2 P. Fargues, Réserves de main-d’oeuvre et rente pétro-
lière. Les migrations de travail vers les pays du Golfe 
(1980)
3 G. Parolin, Citizenship in the Arab World: Kin, Religion 
and the Nation State (2009)
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natural increase. Despite migration being only 
temporary according to the law, de facto many 
migrants have settled in the Gulf, resulting in a 
continuously rising proportion of non-national 
births. As a result, non-nationals have an overall 
rate of population growth consistently higher than 
nationals. 
ADDRESSING THE GCC DEMOGRAPHIC 
CHALLENGE
The governments of the Gulf States see demography 
as a challenge. With the exception of Saudi Arabia, 
the Gulf populations are small in both absolute 
and relative terms (Table 1). Taking only nationals 
into account, Saudi Arabia’s population ranks 58th 
in the world and the other Gulf States between 
145th (Oman) and 187th (Qatar). With 25 million 
nationals in total (2010), the aggregate population 
of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) would 
rank 45th. This is little compared with the GCC’s 
neighbours, particularly Iran, and the source 
countries of the migrants. India’s population is 
fifty times that of the aggregate GCC states. GCC 
demography is also unimpressive in terms of its 
economic potential, a fact which explains the high 
rates of international migration and the fear of 
being overwhelmed by immigrants.
Designed as a response to demographic scarcity, 
international migration produces ambivalent 
outcomes. On the one hand, it compensates for 
local labour shortages, both in terms of quantity 
and quality: the workforce and skills that are not 
available at home must be found in the global 
labour market. On the other hand, international 
migration affects the ratio of non-nationals to 
nationals in the resident population. This ratio 
stands at between 32% in Saudi Arabia (SA) and 
89% in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In terms 
of the labour force, meanwhile, the proportion is 
between 51% (KSA) and 95% (UAE, Qatar). If the 
ratio of non-nationals to nationals is considered 
too high, then governments need to work at either 
increasing the denominator or decreasing the 
numerator. 






Saudi Arabia 2013 20.3
UAE 2010 1.0
Total GCC 25.4
Source: GCC’s National statistical offices 













Source: UN Population database http://esa.un.org/unpd/
wpp/
The first way (increasing the denominator) consists 
of stimulating the natural demographic growth of 
nationals. This is the objective of the pro-birth-
rate policies adopted throughout the Gulf States, 
which are only attenuated in the case of Oman by 
a strong programme of family planning aimed at 
promoting women’s reproductive health.4 
4 Jihan Safar, Mariage et procréation à Oman et au 
Koweït : étude des mutations générationnelles dans le 
contexte d’Etats rentiers (2015)
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The pro-natalist policies adopted in the Gulf are 
unique in terms of the public money spent on 
subsidising marriage, procreation and the rearing 
of children. Moreover, the availability of (migrant) 
domestic workers – which in other contexts would 
free women for economic activity outside the 
household – in the Gulf lightens the burden of 
child rearing. 
The family policies combined with open-door 
policies regarding the immigration of domestic 
workers result in the cancellation of high fertility 
costs at the household level.  Indeed, fertility 
among GCC nationals is still high in comparison 
with all the other parts of the world at the same 
level of per capita income. Nevertheless, it has 
declined in recent years as a result of other Gulf 
State policies designed to enhance the status 
of women, in particular in terms of education. 
Female enrolment rates at secondary school and 
university are high today in all these states, with 
girls typically attending school for more years 
than boys. In the Gulf as elsewhere, the universal 
mechanism is triggered of more educated women 
leading to lower fertility rates.  
In addition, one wonders whether pro-natalist 
policies can actually address the challenge of small 
national populations in the Gulf. Indeed, the high 
birth rates do not respond to the needs of the 
labour markets as it takes 20 to 25 years to produce 
a worker from a new-born baby. Moreover, in the 
segmented societies of the Gulf where nationals 
often stand in the upper ranks, a high fertility 
rate of the nationals will reproduce the elite rather 
than create a working class (which is what these 
countries most need).  
The second way to reduce the non-nationals/
nationals ratio is to decrease the numerator and 
set the objective of a smaller number of non-
nationals. For example, in March 2013 the Kuwaiti 
government proclaimed that its goal was to reduce 
its population of migrants by one million in ten 
years. Two complementary policies are being 
pursued in all the GCC States. A first kind of policy 
aims at indigenising the workforce (‘Gulfization’) 
in the private sector by 1) creating incentives for 
the employment of nationals; and 2) penalising 
the employment of non-nationals. Inaugurated 
25 years ago, these policies have failed – as can be 
seen from Figure 2. There are many reasons for 
this, including the fact that Gulfization policies 
are not popular among employers (who will have 
to pay higher wages to nationals) and they do not 
meet the interests of all citizens (some of whom 
can earn an income from sponsoring numerous 
non-nationals). 
A second sort of policy is intended to limit the 
stay of migrant workers and not permit them 
to establish themselves permanently. Residence 
permits are only temporary, but in the Gulf, as 
elsewhere, a temporary stay may be repeated 
and may turn into a long-term one. The lasting 
settlement of many migrants is demonstrated by 
the emergence of sizeable numbers of ‘second-
generation’ migrants who were born and have 
grown up in the Gulf.
Figure 2: Percentage of foreign nationals in GCC 
populations 1975-2015
Source: Gulf Labour Markets and Migration, http://gulfmi-
gration.eu/
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The end result of the failure of both types of 
policy – replacing migrants with nationals at the 
workplace and only allowing temporary migration 
– is a continuous increase in the proportion of 
non-nationals in the (aggregate GCC) population 
from 36.6% in 1990 to 42.7% in 2010 and to 49.4% 
in 2015. 
An alternative way to reduce the non-nationals/
nationals ratio would have been to transfer 
people from the numerator to the denominator 
by granting citizenship to significant numbers 
of non-citizens. Naturalising foreign nationals 
and opening channels to nationality for second-
generation migrants by introducing some jus soli 
into the nationality law would both reduce the 
numerator (fewer foreigners) and increase the 
denominator (more nationals). The demography 
of the GCC States would start to resemble that 
of Canada, Australia, Singapore and other large 
migrant-receiving countries, where high rates of 
immigration do not translate into high growth 
rates of the foreign population. 
So far, naturalisation has not been implemented 
anywhere in the GCC on a significant scale. 
The only exception is Bahrain, where a grant 
of nationality to many migrants in the early 
2010s was a piece of demographic engineering 
aimed at balancing the Shia and Sunni Muslim 
communities.5 Elsewhere, major migrant 
destination countries have developed policies 
of migrant inclusion and integration. They have 
opened doors to the acquisition of nationality, 
thereby creating new citizens out of former 
foreign nationals and enlarging the demographic 
base of their national populations. However, the 
GCC countries have never travelled down that 
road. On the contrary, they have kept to a strict 
line of not naturalising migrants. Having failed 
to replace migrant workers with nationals, their 
5 F. De Bel-Air, Demography, Migration, and the Labour 
Market in Bahrain, Gulf Labour Markets and Migra-
tion (2015) 
policies have resulted in a narrowing of the relative 
demographic base of their nationals. 
It might seem only common sense to state that 
the GCC countries uniquely combine intense 
immigration with small native populations, and 
that this means foreign majorities. However, this 
is not as automatic as it would seem. In terms 
of the flows of migrants they have received with 
respect to their native populations, Saudi Arabia 
and Oman can be compared with Canada or 
Australia in their period of highest immigration. 
In the case of the emirates (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar 
and each of the seven emirates of the UAE), which 
are often seen as city states, it is interesting to see 
how much they resemble other cities in the global 
south in terms of population growth (Figure 2). 
Given space restrictions, only two cities, Abidjan 
and Abuja (the African capitals coming first in 
alphabetical order), are shown in Figure 2, but 
this is sufficient to affirm that far from being 
unique, Gulf cities are representative of a common 
process of urbanization in emerging economies 
and developing countries. It is also typical that 
urban settings are built by migrant workers. 
However, unlike the large cities of the south and 
immigration states, the migrants in the Gulf are 
not part of the nations they have helped to build. 
Nation-building has been done by exclusion rather 
than by inclusion of the migrants.6
6 P. Fargues, “Immigration Without Inclusion: Non-Na-
tionals in Nation-Building in the Gulf States,” Asian 
and Pacific Migration Journal 20 (2011): 281-282.
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Fig. 2: Demographic Growth of Major Gulf 
Cities and Selected Non-Gulf Cities 1950-2011
Source: United Nations, Population Division, World Urban-
ization Prospects, 2014 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpd/
wup/FinalReport/
The official discourse legitimising the no-
naturalisation line holds that integrating migrants 
and granting them nationality would endanger 
the culture and welfare system of the nation: 
the culture by bringing alien values, and welfare 
by increasing the number of those entitled to 
benefits. The common argument is that the policy 
of protecting citizens by closing off citizenship to 
foreign nationals is dictated by the demographic 
uniqueness of the GCC states, i.e. small national 
populations faced with large numbers of migrants. 
However, as suggested above, the relationship 
between demography and policies has worked the 
other way around. The demographic uniqueness 
of the Gulf States is a product of their policies. 
The question is: to what extent are these policies 
sustainable?
CONCLUSION
Non-nationals or non-citizens form demographic 
majorities in the workforces of the Gulf States and 
in the total populations of four of them. Many 
come alone on short-term contracts, after which 
they normally return home. Others have their 
contracts renewed again and again and they settle. 
They do not cut their links with their homelands 
– where the governments are keen to engage with 
their diaspora in several ways, from attracting 
their savings to attracting their ballots – but most 
of their lives are spent in the Gulf. They are non-
citizens for a lifetime and their rights are severely 
limited in the place where they live. Will this 
situation change? 
Internal moves from within the Gulf States 
are possible. Debates amongst Gulf citizens 
have started on the subject of amending (if not 
abolishing) the kafâla system.7 Nevertheless, there 
has been no strong voice on the most sensitive 
issue, that of naturalising migrants (or some of 
them). In a context where the voices of migrants 
themselves are silenced, it seems unlikely that the 
duality of the Gulf societies will evolve as a result 
of internal forces. 
Can external forces cause a change? The migrant 
origin states increasingly engage in supporting 
their expatriate nationals, although their level 
of engagement greatly varies from one state to 
another. They work to make migration financially 
profitable for the migrant and for his or her 
country of origin, and increasingly also protect 
their workers abroad from exploitation and abuse. 
However, the states of origin would not support 
their citizens’ efforts to obtain full membership – 
and eventually citizenship – in other states (the 
destination countries of their migrants). The game 
is instead being played outside the region. With 
the rise of a global civil society, the international 
community is keeping a watchful eye on migrants 
in terms of human and labour rights. Its means 
of efficiently defending the people involved are 
still limited, particularly in countries where 
human and migrant rights organisations are not 
represented. But their loud voice in international 
fora and on the web must be heard everywhere. 
7 M. Dito, “Labor Migration in the GCC Countries: 
Some Reflections on a Chronic Dilemna,” Middle East 
Institute (2010) 
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CHANGING GLOBAL DYNAMICS 
BETWEEN THE GULF, THE US, 
AND ASIA: IMPLICATIONS 
FOR THE EU
Abdullah Baabood. Director,  
Gulf Studies Center,  
Qatar University
INTRODUCTION
Since the United States (US) with its “Pax 
Americana” replaced the British with their 
“Pax Britannica” as the new hegemonic power 
and the main security guarantor of the Gulf in 
the 1970s, there have been some underlying 
shifts in the regional and global systems. These 
include: the overthrow of the Shah of Iran by the 
Islamic Revolution in the late 1970s; the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in 1980; the Iran-Iraq 
War (1980-1988), culminating in the creation of 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981; 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990) and Kuwait’s 
subsequent liberation by Operation Desert 
Shield and Operation Desert Storm (1991); the 
formal end of the Cold War (1990); the fall of 
the Soviet Union (1991); the ratification of the 
European Union (1993); the invasion of Iraq and 
the downfall of Saddam Hussain’s regime (2003); 
the Arab Spring (2011); and a plethora of global 
energy and financial crises. During this period of 
turmoil, relations between the GCC and the West 
(the US and Europe) were challenged and tested 
but remained intact due to interdependency 
and mutual interest in energy, economic, and 
security cooperation. However, recent shifts in 
and changing dynamics of global geopolitics have 
shaken the enduring cooperative relations between 
the two sides, creating a new dimension of GCC 
relations with the US and Asia, with implications 
for the EU. 
THE SHIFT TO ASIA
The global demand for energy is increasingly 
coming from the East rather than the West, with 
China already becoming the world’s largest net 
importer of oil and India being the third largest. 
Two thirds of Gulf oil went to Europe and the 
United States in 1980, but this has fallen to one 
third by 2004.1 The recent East-bound Gulf oil flow 
indicates that there will be noticeable changes in the 
geo-strategic considerations among the countries 
concerned. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia’s visits 
to India and China in 2006 were evidence of this 
pivotal shift in the global energy market. China 
is actively working on securing access to Middle 
East energy. It is trying to build a Maritime Silk 
Road between Asia and Europe through the 
development of Oman’s Sohar Port and Freezone, 
which is linked to the Arabian Peninsula and 
the Gulf countries.2  Beijing has also announced 
a $46bn investment plan that will be heavily 
concentrated in the China-Pakistan Economic 
Corridor (CPEC) a combination of transport and 
energy projects, and the development of a major 
deep-sea port providing direct access to the Indian 
Ocean and beyond.3 For the Chinese, this region 
holds geo-strategic significance as the corridor 
through Gwadar gives them their shortest access 
to the Middle East and Africa. In addition, China 
is investing in a number of ports in Asia, aiming to 
access sources of energy and increase its influence 
over maritime routes.
1 A. Echagüe, “Change or Continuity? US Policy Towards 
the Middle East and Its Implications For EU policy,” 
Documentos de Trabajo FRIDE 95 (2010). 
2 G. Knowler,  “China Focuses Attention on Omani 
Port of Sohar,” 26 January 2015, http://www.joc.com/
port-news/china-focuses-attention-omani-port-so-
har_20150126  
3 “Is China-Pakistan ‘Silk Road’ a Game-Changer?,” 
BBC, 22 April 2015,  http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
asia-32400091.
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Similarly, India has become increasingly 
dependent on Middle East oil for its extensive 
appetite for energy, with the region becoming the 
largest supplier for India’s growing energy needs. 
To better access the energy in the region, India has 
discussed an Iran-Oman-India pipeline project for 
transportation of natural gas.4 Previously, projects 
such as the envisioned India-Pakistan-Iran 
pipeline were unsuccessful due to the difficulty of 
constructing and investing in such infrastructure 
in Pakistan with its many lawless tribal regions.
There is another factor contributing to the shift, 
this time from the US side. The so-called shale 
revolution, which is also referred to as a game 
changer in the global energy market, has allowed 
the US to become less dependent on Gulf oil. This 
has diminished US interest in the region and will 
result in a reduced role as security guarantor, as 
the cost now outweighs the possible benefit. The 
fact that the pivot of US foreign policy is also 
shifting toward the East explains the weakening 
motivation of the US to remain deeply involved in 
the Gulf region. 
Second, over the past few decades, the GCC states 
have witnessed rapid economic growth, with the 
value of their economies reaching $1.6 trillion in 
2013 and their financial surplus in sovereign wealth 
funds touching $2 trillion. This economic boom 
has given the GCC much-needed confidence and 
the GCC members have increasingly diversified 
their external market integration and investment 
friendliness.
However, the GCC’s economic structure is largely 
driven by oil and gas exports. The oil and gas 
sector amounts to 63 percent of the public revenue 
of these countries, or 41 percent of their GDP 
and over 70 percent of their total export revenue. 
Given the GCC’s levels of oil and gas reserves (40 
4 K. Taneja, “India’s Importance in the Middle East,” 22 
April 2014,  http://warontherocks.com/2014/04/indias-
growing-strategic-importance-to-the-middle-east-and-
persian-gulf/ 
percent of the world’s total crude oil production 
and 15 percent of global gas production), it will be 
no surprise if the GCC States’ strategic relations 
become increasingly aligned with the emerging 
changes in the energy markets and the global 
energy demand emanating from Asia. As a result of 
internal growth dynamics and global headwinds, 
the GCC’s external relationships are inexorably 
shifting from the historically dominant EU and 
US to the emerging markets of Asia. In sum, 
substantial changes in global economic weights 
over the past decades have increasingly shifted the 
Gulf countries’ economic focus towards the Asian 
continent. 
Moreover, the GCC-Asia trade relationship, 
which was initially founded on the energy 
requirements of established and emerging Asian 
economies, is no longer limited to energy and 
GCC hydrocarbon reserves. The change in the 
emphasis of GCC trade patterns is clear and the 
focus of Gulf business is moving eastwards. A 
cursory glance at the region today would support 
this view. Asia is now the GCC’s most important 
trade partner, both in terms of its hydrocarbon 
exports and also of its imports of machinery, 
manufactured goods and food. Intensified bilateral 
investment relations have accompanied the GCC’s 
growing trade ties with developing Asia. Migrant 
workers from Asia, especially from the Indian 
subcontinent, now account for more than half of 
the GCC’s labour force, significantly contributing 
to economic prosperity and development in the 
Gulf monarchies.
This shift eastward is unsurprising given the 
travails of the developed Western economies. With 
the sluggish recovery from the financial crisis in 
the EU and the US, Gulf economies have had to 
look elsewhere. For example, the UK, a traditional 
trading partner, has failed to hit growth of 2% in 
the last five years, while the US has fared little 
better with annual growth rates stuck below 3%. 
On the other hand, in the same period China has 
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recorded average straight-line annual growth of 
8.9% and India has achieved a rate of 7%.
China-GCC trade ties are strengthening at a 
faster rate than investment. By 2020, China 
will be the biggest export market for the GCC, 
and Chinese investment in the GCC is on the 
rise, mostly in wholesale and retail trade, with a 
significant increase in Saudi Arabia. In contrast, 
Gulf companies have secured comparatively 
few refinery projects in China, and portfolio 
investments have been limited.
Third, the established strength of Chinese and 
Indian military power marks these countries as 
influential players in the global security order, 
which may provide the Gulf countries with a 
potential future option for their security insurance, 
helping to fill the power vacuum which the US, 
much as the British did in the past, looks likely to 
leave. According to the Global Firepower Military 
Rankings 2015, China and India rank respectively 
as the third and the fourth largest world military 
powers after the US and Russia.
In fact, China has been visibly engaging in military 
missions overseas with its increasing military 
strength. The Chinese navy was dispatched to 
Somali waters in 2008. In 2010, Chinese navy 
vessels docked in Iran and at Port Zayed in the 
United Arab Emirates in order to participate in 
counter-piracy operation5 and China commenced 
a bilateral counter-piracy exercise with the US in 
the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa on 11 
December 2014.6 China has initiated joint anti-
piracy exercises and naval visits to neighbouring 
countries and the Middle East region for the 
purpose of military diplomacy as well as to protect 
strategic trade routes, building interim technical 
5 M. Singh, “China’s Military Presence in the Gulf,” 
26 September 2014, http://blogs.wsj.com/wash-
wire/2014/09/26/chinas-military-presence-in-the-gulf/. 
6 US Navy,  “China Conduct Anti-Piracy Exercise”, 12 
December 2014, http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.
asp?story_id=84858 
service stops in Djibouti, Oman, Saudi Arabia, 
and Sudan.7
Likewise, India has also been militarily active 
in the Gulf.8 In 2008 India and Qatar signed a 
defence agreement establishing the foundations 
for a deeper Indian involvement in the region. 
Under the agreement, New Delhi committed to 
protect Qatar from external threats. The deal with 
Qatar leads to the possibility of India providing 
military support in an event in which shipping 
lines become blocked and hamper the free flow 
of oil and gas to the sub-continental shores. India 
signed a similar defence pact with Saudi Arabia 
in 2014. This implies that China and India, while 
currently far from being global powers, are already 
playing a strategic role as reliable and capable 
international military powers. The GCC states’ 
strengthening ties with these countries signal that 
they may prove to be appropriate potential future 
alternatives to the dwindling influence in the 
region of the US. 
THE GCC, THE US AND THE EU
The opposing views held by the US and the Gulf 
countries in addressing critical regional issues 
further complicate matters between the two sides. 
Indeed, the US and the Gulf states have begun to 
diverge on many issues, such as the US nuclear 
deal with Iran and crises in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. 
The US-Iran nuclear deal is perhaps the main 
issue that is threatening to compromise the long 
history of relations between the US and the Gulf 
states. Given the fundamental sectarian tension 
between the Arab Gulf states and Iran with respect 
to the balance of power in the region, the decades-
old efforts by the US in reaching a framework 
agreement on the nuclear issue with Iran – from 
7 D. Sun, “China’s Soft Military Presence in the Middle 
East,” 11 March 2015, http://www.mei.edu/content/
map/china%E2%80%99s-soft-military-presence-mid-
dle-east 
8 Taneja, “India’s Importance”, op. cit.
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which the GCC states have been excluded – pose 
a significant threat for the GCC, as Iran has been 
able to gradually step closer to its goal of becoming 
a nuclear power. The sense of urgency has not 
been shared by the US, which has persisted with 
diplomatic measures without a willingness to take 
more decisive actions.
The Syrian crisis is another major issue that has 
weakened the bond between the US and the GCC 
states. From the Gulf States’ perspectives, the 
continuing survival of the Assad regime remains a 
source of instability that may result in a dangerous 
spillover effect in neighbouring countries such as 
Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq. Accordingly, the Arab 
Gulf countries have thrown their support behind 
the opposition movement and called for a lifting of 
the arms embargo, which has prevented necessary 
outside arms support from being delivered to the 
people on the ground. Meanwhile, the US has 
resisted calls for the lifting of the arms embargo 
and even vetoed the possibility of supplying 
adequate weaponry to the rebel forces.9 
With such momentous shifts in the strategic 
relations between the GCC and the US and the 
GCC and the two major Asian powers of China 
and India, one might legitimately wonder what 
implications these changes will have for Europe, 
given the historical relations between the Gulf and 
Europe and the existing economic and political 
interests shared by the two regions. 
Essentially, EU-GCC relations commenced in the 
late 1980s with the two regional organizations 
signing a Cooperation Agreement in 1989 that 
provided for intra-regional cooperation in many 
fields, including economic, energy, environmental, 
education and research, customs, and other 
technical fields. The agreement also initiated 
9 A. Sager, “Whither GCC-US Relations?,” Gulf Research 




a political dialogue that was accompanied by 
negotiations on free trade. This relationship was 
based on historic engagement and reciprocal 
interests in trade, energy investment and security, 
in which the two regions enjoy a high degree of 
complementarity.
However, the meagre outcome of this relationship 
shows that it has been difficult for the EU and the 
GCC to move from their rather simple cooperation 
to a more strategic partnership. This is due to 
conditions set by both parties: the EU has failed 
to recognize the full value of the GCC countries’ 
economic and geopolitical potential beyond the 
Middle East context. Furthermore, the absence of 
a unified EU policy towards the Gulf region has 
produced contradictions between the bilateral and 
multilateral tracks of EU-GCC diplomacy. There 
is no consensus within the GCC side regarding 
a strategic partnership with the EU. This could 
be attributable to the fact that “both parties have 
given priority to their partnership with the US, 
which is more able than the EU to provide the 
security guarantees that the Gulf needs and on 
which it bases its foreign policy.10
However, the EU’s position on the critical issues 
in the region has not always been in accordance 
with US policy, despite managing to fit itself in the 
direction of the US perspective in most regards. 
In particular, the EU and the US demonstrated 
differing stances on addressing the crisis in Syria 
after the Arab uprising swept the region in 2011.
Given the sensitive context of the Gulf, where 
the EU, the US, and the GCC countries do not 
always see eye to eye, the recent dynamic shifts 
in GCC-US and GCC-Asia relations should 
be clearly understood by the EU vis-à-vis its 
policy towards the region. In fact, there are a 
number of reasons why the EU needs to consider 
10 C. Bianco, “EU-GCC Cooperation in an Era of 
Socio-Economic Challenges,” Istituto Affari Inter-
nazionali (2014), http://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/
eu-gcc-cooperation-era-socio-economic-challenges
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developing its current relations with the Gulf into 
a more strategic partnership, and the changes in 
GCC relations with the US and Asia allow more 
space for such developments. First of all, better 
partnership between the EU and the Gulf can be 
helpful in resolving the financial and economic 
crisis in Europe. With the Gulf countries’ sizeable 
financial reserves, compounded with their 
inflated economies, the EU could greatly benefit 
from foreign direct investment from the GCC. 
In addition, there are many areas where the EU 
and the GCC states share similar interests, such as 
countering terrorism and maintaining stability in 
the region, especially in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) region with a particular focus on 
containing Iran’s nuclear ambitions and securing a 
stable energy flow. The facts that the volume of EU-
GCC trade is twice the size of that between the US 
and that the GCC and the EU economies have a 
greater reliance on Gulf energy than the US should 
encourage the EU to take a more solid approach 
towards the region. Although the US presence 
and its influence in the region still remains strong 
compared to any other international actor, mutual 
interests in many issues and mutual economic and 
strategic significance mean that it is time for the 
EU to play a more active role in the region than it 
did before.
The EU should note that the combination of 
the decreased US interest in the region and the 
GCC states’ mistrust of US policy creates a more 
favourable environment for the EU. In addition, 
the role China and India can play in the region’s 
security is still limited compared to the traditional 
Western powers. Indeed, some EU member states 
such as the UK and France have made large 
contributions to GCC security and continue to do 
so via bilateral security arrangements and arms 
sales. These bilateral arrangements could be useful 
in augmenting collective EU-GCC relations.
The EU and the GCC need to reconsider their 
relations and learn from previous pitfalls. It is 
fair to say that there has been a period of missed 
opportunities because of the stagnant free trade 
negotiations that have not lead to anything 
substantial and have hampered the healthy 
development of close intra-regional relations. 
Moreover, further efforts to revive EU-GCC 
relations through the Joint Action Program (JAP) 
have not yielded any useful results, and neither has 
the political dialogue, which continued to reiterate 
previously held positions and failed to unfreeze the 
deadlock in the free trade negotiations. This is an 
opportune moment to reconsider this relationship 
in the light of the changing global dynamics.
CONCLUSIONS
The implications of changing global, Gulf-US and 
Gulf-Asia dynamics for the EU represent a positive 
signal of a valuable opportunity for Europe 
to become more engaged in this strategically 
important region. Due to the Asian powers’ 
rapidly growing energy needs and their need to 
secure stable access to Gulf oil, the economic and 
strategic ties of the GCC with China and India 
have grown significantly. Alongside this, the 
decreasing US energy dependence on the region 
as a result of domestic shale energy production has 
shaken the historic partnership between the Gulf 
and the US. Furthermore, the established military 
strength of China and India has allowed them a 
deeper engagement in the Gulf, which is also made 
possible by the pivotal change in US foreign policy 
towards the East. The differing stance between 
the GCC countries and the US on critical issues 
in the region, including the Iranian nuclear deal 
and crises in Syria and Yemen, has prompted the 
Gulf states to diversify their security partnerships. 
However, all of these changes in fact offer the EU 
more space to project its own policy toward the 
region, as the possibility of less US presence is 
becoming more apparent and the Asian powers 
still enjoy only limited influence there. Given the 
economic and strategic potential of the Gulf region, 
the European powers should strive to direct these 
shifting dynamics in favour of their own interests. 
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INTRODUCTION
Starting with Iraq after the US military 
intervention in 2003, and culminating with the 
Arab spring in 2011, the quest for democracy in 
Iraq, Bahrain and Syria has rapidly turned into a 
sectarian conflict between Shias and Sunnis. With 
the open military intervention of the Lebanese 
Hezbollah in Syria, and the growing presence of 
the Iranian Guardians of the Revolution on the 
side of the Bashar regime in Syria, and of the Shia 
government in Iraq, local civil wars have turned 
into a regional confrontation between a Shia axis 
supported by Iran and a Sunni axis supported by 
Saudi Arabia. This polarization extends to Yemen, 
where the Zaidites, a dissident Shia community 
dominant in the North with no affinity with the 
mainstream “Twelver” Shiism, have received the 
support of Iran, while the Saudis have launched 
a military campaign in support of the Sunni 
opponents. Here, we can see a change of alliances: 
in the sixties the Zaidites were supported by Saudi 
Arabia because they were defending the Yemeni 
monarchy against an alliance of Arab nationalists 
and socialists which mainly recruited among 
Sunnis.
How should this sudden religious polarization be 
interpreted? Is it the expression of a centuries-old 
religious divide or the result of a new geo-strategic 
alignment in the Middle East, where conflict 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia through proxies 
has replaced the Israel-Palestine conflict?
SHIISM: FROM POLITICS TO THEOLOGY
The historical divide between Shias and Sunnis had 
nothing to do with theology: it was the result of a 
feud for the Prophet’s succession. Ali, the fourth 
Caliph, cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet, and 
his son Hussein lost the battle. Subsequently, their 
followers (the Shias) withdrew from politics. In the 
course of history they developed a specific theology 
centred on the imamat: the spiritual leadership 
of a certain number of direct descendants of Ali, 
who became the leading religious model for the 
Shias. The main concept of the dominant school, 
the Twelvers, is that the twelfth imam has been 
“occulted” and will come back at the end of time.
The mainstream Shias, the Twelvers, consider the 
twelfth Imam to be the last, while other groups, far 
less numerous, chose to stop or diverge at some 
point (the fifth Imam for the Zaydis, the seventh 
for the Ismailis, etc.). Other groups reserve special 
worship for Ali without referring to the line of 
imamat, and thus are often described by the Sunnis 
as extreme Shias (but most of the Shias do not 
recognize them as part of the family), the Alawis 
of Syria and the Alevis of Turkey for instance. The 
early Shias used to be concentrated around the 
north of the Persian Gulf and in the south of what 
is now Lebanon.
The religious divide turned into politics when the 
Safavi dynasty took over Iran (1501) and decided 
to adopt Twelver Shiism as the state religion. 
At that time, the four large empires (Ottoman, 
Safavis, Uzbeks and Moghols) that fought for 
supremacy from Istanbul to Delhi and Samarkand 
were headed by Turkic dynasties so the opposition 
between Iran and the others was rapidly framed 
in terms of a religious divide. In 1517, Selim II, 
the Ottoman Sultan, reclaimed the title of Caliph, 
which had become obsolete since the fall of the 
Abbasid lineage in 1257, to claim a religious 
Sunni legitimacy. During the same century, the 
Safavis brought religious Arab Shia families into 
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Iran to create a Shia state clergy which could be 
anchored into an Arab genealogy, setting the basis 
for the emergence of great transnational clerical 
families (Arabo-persian) that are still prominent 
in the Shia clergy (the Musavi, Sadr, Shirazi and 
Tabataba’I, etc).
Another reason for turning to orthodox Arab 
Shia clerics was to establish some distance from 
the popular “Alevism” of the Turkmen troops, 
which was too “heterodox” and “shamanic” for it 
to be made the official religion of a former Sunni 
society. Two events contributed to shaping the 
contemporary form of this new Shia clergy: the 
Afghan invasion of Iran in 1727 led to the exile 
of the leading Shia clergy to Najaf and Kerbala in 
the Ottoman territory, where they were granted 
extra-territoriality (it was only to be abolished 
in 1979 by Saddam Hussein); and the theological 
quarrel over ijtihad1 versus taqlid,2 which was won 
by the reformists, led to the progressive fixation 
of the “marjayya”, i.e. the institutionalization of 
the figure of the “Mojtahed” as being entitled to 
provide religious guidance to believers and to 
train mollahs who would teach in his name and 
convey the religious tax or khums to their “great 
ayatollah” or Mojtahed. A college of a dozen co-
opted Mojtahed has ruled over the Shia clergy 
since that time. The concept of marjayyat took on 
1 “Islamic legal term meaning “independent reasoning,” 
as opposed to taqlid (imitation). One of four sources 
of Sunni law. Utilized where the  Quran  and Sunnah 
(the first two sources) are silent. It requires a thorough 
knowledge of theology, revealed texts and legal theory 
(usul al-fiqh), a sophisticated capacity for legal reason-
ing, and a thorough knowledge of Arabic” (Esposito 
2013).
2 “Conformity to legal precedent, traditional behaviour, 
and doctrines. Often juxtaposed by reformers with ijti-
had, independent reasoning based on revelation. Tradi-
tionally, legal precedent is considered binding in Islamic 
law, but taqlid has acquired a negative connotation 
among modern reformers, who use the term to refer to 
cultural and intellectual stagnation and unwillingness 
to experiment with new ideas. Reformist criticism has 
taken both fundamentalist and modernist directions” 
(Esposito 2013).
a political dimension when the Iranian revolution 
put an end to the collegiality of the Ayatollas by 
making the supposedly “greater” of them both 
a spiritual and political leader, a function called 
“velayat-e faqih”, or “regency of the doctor of the 
law”.
Since the 18th century the Shia clergy has 
become politically autonomous, economically 
independent, transnational and hierarchized, 
although Iran has been the only country to claim 
Shiism as its “national” religion. Iran thus became 
closely associated with Shiism, although after the 
fall of the Safavis, no monarch used it as the main 
tool of foreign influence until the victory of the 
Islamic revolution of 1979. In parallel, tensions 
between Sunnis and Shias seemed to decrease 
everywhere in the wake of the Nahda movement, 
which started at the end of the 19th century 
precisely because of a debate over re-opening 
“ijtihad”, to the point that in 1958 the university 
of Al Azhar declared that it is permissible for a 
Muslim to follow the jaffari legal school of thought 
(mazhab3). Jaffari (after the 6th Imam, Jaffar, who 
endeavoured to outline what a Shia fiqh could be) 
become the conventional neutral denomination 
for Shiism. In the present litigious context, to refer 
to the Jaffari legal system connotes an inclusive 
attitude towards the Shias. There have been many 
intermarriages between Shias and Sunnis in 
Pakistan since its independence and also in some 
Arab countries, and sectarian identity was not an 
issue until 1977.
However, the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979 
changed everything. For a second time Shiism 
became associated with a state strategy of regional 
expansionism coupled with a revolutionary call 
to topple the existing Arab regimes. In parallel, 
in its opposition both to Israel and to Iran, Arab 
3 A legal school of thought is called a mazhab, which 
means that it is not a different religious interpretation 
but just a variation in legal interpretations. To call Shi-
ism a mazhab is to re-introduce it into mainstream 
Islamic orthodoxy.
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nationalism took on an increasingly religious 
Sunni dimension under the growing leadership 
of Saudi Arabia: the Wahhabis and the Salafis 
used theological arguments to condemn Shias as 
renegades (rafidhin). The Sunnitisation of Arab 
militancy also had a side effect: the marginalisation 
of the Arab Christians.
Neither the Iranian revolution nor the salafisation 
of Sunnism came out of the blue, even though 
the religious radicalization that was at work 
before 1979 went mainly unnoticed by Western 
observers. While the role played by Wahhabism 
and Saudi Arabia has been acknowledged, little 
research has been conducted on the Shia revival 
that preceded the Iranian revolution because 
the revolution put the focus on Iran, while the 
movement of radicalization had been happening 
widely outside Iran.
THE SHIA REVIVAL BEFORE THE IRANIAN 
ISLAMIC REVIVAL
Many local rural Shia communities in Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, southern Iraq and southern Lebanon in 
the mid-20th century were not under the control of 
the clergy of Najaf and Qom. They were under the 
leadership of big landowners (zaim in Lebanon, 
arbab in central Afghanistan) and they were 
usually called by specific ethnic names (metwalis 
in Lebanon, hazara in Afghanistan). However, 
from the 1950s a dual movement of clericalisation 
and social mobilization took place. Young clerics 
trained in the howze (Shia religious schools) of 
Najaf and Qom came back to their places of origin, 
or were even sent by leading ayatollahs, to launch a 
sort of “awakening” religious movement that went 
in parallel with contestation of the leadership of 
the landowners and a call for education and social 
reforms. The movement was also associated with 
rural migration, with local young Shias going to 
the capital (Beyrouth) or abroad (Iran and Iraq for 
the Afghan Shias). While working as “migrants”, 
many youths also went to religious schools, the 
level of which was far higher than in the Sunni 
madrasa, which played the same role in Pakistan, 
Afghanistan and the Gulf for the Sunnis.
The great names of the new religious militants are, 
among others, Musa Sadr for South Lebanon, who 
set up the “amal” movement, and Sayyed Balkhi in 
Afghanistan. Both of these “clericalized” the local 
Shia communities by appointing modern clerics, 
and disenclaved them by connecting them to the 
religious centres of Shiism, jumping from the local 
to the global, and often bypassing the national state 
where Shias were underrepresented (Lebanon, 
Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Gulf states). They also 
contributed to homogenizing Shia communities 
by encouraging them to adopt Iranian-style rites, 
practices and dress (for the celebration of Ashura,4 
for instance) and discarding local folklore and 
popular religion. A common clerical Shia culture, 
which later would turn into a political and 
ideological one, took shape from Beirut to Karachi.
This movement of religious revival was not directed 
by Iran, although there is evidence that the Shah 
of Iran provided help to Musa Sadr. It was mainly 
managed by the various great ayatollahs of Najaf 
and Kerbala. In fact, although the ayatollahs usually 
shared the same religious views, there were many 
reasons for them to compete among themselves: 
their networks of followers were not bound by 
ethnic, national or linguistic borders, and more 
followers meant more financial resources, which 
allowed them to open madrasas and charities 
and thus enhance their religious and ipso facto 
political influence. The main difference among 
them concerned their attitudes to politics: the 
4 “Commemoration of the martyrdom in 680 of Husayn, 
Muhammad’s grandson and the third imam of Shii 
Islam. Shii communities annually reenact the tragedy 
in a passion play, including self-mortification and dis-
plays of sorrow and remorse intended to unite them 
in Husayn’s suffering and death as an aid to salvation 
on the Day of Judgment.” In Esposito, John (ed.), The 
Oxford Dictionary of Islam (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013).
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most influential ayatollah of Najaf, Khu’y, rejected 
the concept of Islamic revolution, and was quietist 
and somewhat conservative, while ayatollah Baqer 
al Sadr was far more involved in politics (and 
would be executed by Saddam Hussein in 1980). 
However, both schools of thought contributed to 
the mobilisation and homogenisation of the local 
Shia communities by connecting them to a clerical 
and international centre. It is also worthwhile to 
note that the Iranian clergy was not the most 
active nor the most radical. Until 1963, ayatollah 
Khomeyni was quite conservative; it was only 
when the Shah launched his “white revolution” 
that he became a vocal opponent of the regime and 
shifted to a revolutionary Islam, attracting younger 
radical clerics (hodjat ol-islam, like Mottahari).
This religious revival touched only the Twelver 
Shias. During the sixties the Yemeni Zaydis were 
split between royalists and republicans, but were 
massively opposed to the socialists of South 
Yemen, and thus closer to Saudi Arabia, while both 
the Turkish Alevis and the Syrian Alawis joined 
nationalist and secular political parties (CHP and 
Baas).
THE WATERSHED OF THE IRANIAN 
REVOLUTION: FROM RELIGION TO 
POLITICS. 
The Iranian Islamist regime immediately took a 
radical pan-Islamist approach and emphasized a 
strong anti-imperialist anti-Zionist revolutionary 
stand against the existing Arab regimes. However, 
it failed to attract the Sunni masses. The Iraqi 
attack on Iran in September 1980, followed by 
a bloody 8-year war, undermined the Iranian 
appeal to the Sunnis. Most Arab countries (with 
the exception of Syria) backed Iraq, and they 
were followed, with more or less enthusiasm, 
by the Islamist movements (Muslim Brothers). 
Sunni solidarity worked. Iran never succeeded 
in attracting militant Sunni groups, but only 
splinter groups (like Sheykh Cha’aban in Tripoli, 
Lebanon). The picture was more mixed with the 
Shia Arabs because the Iranian regime requested 
not only their strategic support against Saddam 
Hussein but also an ideological commitment 
to the revolution and its leading principle of 
velayat-e faqih. Many traditional Shia clerics 
(Shamseddin in Lebanon, Khuy in Iraq) refused 
to accept velayat-e faqih and kept a neutral stand 
on the war. Others, like Fadlallah in Lebanon, 
politically endorsed the cause of Iran but still 
rejected velayat-e faqih for religious reasons. By 
contrast, many mid-level clerics who were part of 
the Shia “awakening” enthusiastically backed both 
revolutionary Iran and the concept of velayat. To 
ensure its control of Shiism, the Iranian regime 
launched a campaign of “revolutionization” 
inside foreign Shia communities and backed 
new revolutionary organisations either against 
traditional political parties (Amal in Lebanon) 
or in parallel with them (Da’wat in Iraq). In some 
cases this resulted in a Shia civil war: in the Shia 
region of Hazarajat in Afghanistan the pro-Iranian 
Nasr movement fought and won a tough civil war 
against the moderate “shura” from 1982 to 1984; 
in Lebanon the Hezbollah won hegemony over 
the Shias; and in Iraq the Supreme Council for the 
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) was founded 
in Iran in 1982 and received the bulk of Iranian 
support.
THE SUNNI BACKLASH
Even though many Shia leaders (Khu’y in Iraq, 
Shirazi for the Gulf states) did not endorse the 
Iranian revolution, the Arab regimes tended to 
perceive Shias in general as an Iranian fifth column. 
Restrictions were put on public religious practices 
(Ashura) and many were expelled from Iraq and 
Kuwait, dubbed Iranians. Only in Lebanon did 
the war enable Hezbollah to become a prominent 
political party and the leading military force in the 
country.
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However, another kind of Sunni reaction rose 
from below, even though it was encouraged by 
the growing policy of re-Islamization initiated 
by many Sunni states. In Pakistan, for instance, 
the Islamization policy decided by General Zia 
ul Haqq after the coup of 1977 resulted in the 
imposition of zakat (tax on wealth) on individual 
bank accounts. The Shias protested, saying that 
they paid the khums directly to their religious 
authorities and thus should be exempted from 
zakat. They won their case but the consequence was 
that people had to register as either Shia or Sunni, 
which thus led to an “obligation to choose” and 
transformed what was a “grey area” about religious 
affiliations into an increasing sectarianisation of 
public space. A radical Sunni group created in the 
Punjab in 1985, Sipah-e Saheban, waged a terrorist 
war against the Shias. Many members of the Shia 
elite were killed just because they were Shias. 
In south Punjab, the Shias began to regroup in 
distinctive neighbourhoods that were more easily 
defensible and many mosques were transformed 
into militarized strongholds. This phenomenon, 
despite having been triggered by a small group of 
militants, generated forms of ethnic cleansing and 
regrouping by sectarian affiliation everywhere. 
The civil war in Lebanon resulted in the same 
polarisation, as did the civil war that de facto 
broke out in Iraq after the US invasion of 2003. In 
parallel, the Wahhabi authorities launched fatwa 
upon fatwa to qualify the Shias as “renegades”. The 
spirit of the Al Azhar fatwa of 1958 was dead.
Once again, the growing antagonism between Shias 
and Sunnis had nothing to do with a “millenial” 
hatred, but with a strategic realignment that 
resulted from both a backlash against the Iranian 
revolution and from a religious revival turned into 
an ideological radicalisation that touched both 
Shias and Sunnis. The geostrategic struggle for 
hegemony in the Middle East enlarged and even 
re-created the religious divide between Shias and 
Sunnis, as did the wave of re-Islamization, because 
the latter focussed precisely on “who owns Islam?” 
This paradox of the Islamist revival was not 
understood at the time by the West, which saw 
the Iranian revolution as the vanguard of a global 
Islamic radicalization, without seeing that, by 
definition, this re-Islamization would exacerbate 
the sectarian religious divides within the Muslim 
world.
IRAN: FROM PAN-ISLAMISM TO A 
COALITION OF MINORITIES IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST
In 1989 with the death of Khomeini, it seemed 
that the Islamic revolution had failed to make a 
breakthrough among the Sunnis and was stuck 
everywhere in a “Shia ghetto”. Nevertheless, Iran 
did not renounce its strategy of becoming the leader 
of the Middle East: it downplayed its revolutionary 
dimension, tried to mend fences with Arab 
regimes and recast its appeal through support for 
the great cause that nobody could ignore: the fight 
against Israel. Hezbollah and Hamas were the two 
show-case players in this strategy. In a word, Iran 
paradoxically played more on “Arab nationalism” 
than on “Islamic revolution”. Arming Hezbollah 
and Hamas, adopting an intransigent attitude 
towards Israel, and building a nuclear programme 
to achieve its sanctuarisation were the main 
pillars of the Iranian strategy. The conservative 
Arab regimes saw Iran more as a threat than as 
an ally against Israel, but were restrained by the 
popularity of the Palestinian cause among their 
populations.
Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia waged a “clandestine” 
campaign against Iran by supporting radical 
Sunni movements that would fight Iran and 
the Shias everywhere in close cooperation with 
Pakistan, which wanted to thwart Iranian (and 
Indian) influence in Afghanistan. Radical Sunni 
movements were supported more or less openly: 
the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Lashkar-i Jhangvi 
in Pakistan, and other radical groups in Iranian 
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Baluchistan. However, this policy backfired on 11 
September 2001 when it became obvious that some 
of the radical Sunni movements, even strongly 
anti-Shia ones, saw the West as their main target. 
Saudi Arabia and the Salafi radicals would never 
be able to disentangle the “good” anti-Shia Sunni 
radicals from the “bad” terrorist movements.
The apex of the Iranian strategy was the Israeli 
attack in South Lebanon and its relative defeat 
in the face of Hezbollah (summer 2006). For a 
short period, Nasrallah became the hero of the 
Arab street, and Hezbollah the champion of Arab 
nationalism. Its support for Hamas allowed Iran 
to appear to bypass the Shia-Sunni divide in the 
name of the common fight against Zionism.
Curiously, this strategy crumbled six months later 
with the execution of Saddam Hussein, which 
was the indicator that a new civil war had started 
in Iraq, opposing the new Shia rulers against the 
Sunni minority after the US invasion. Falluja 
replaced South Lebanon in radical Sunni imagery. 
A second event was the Arab spring: this refocused 
Arab politics on national and domestic issues, to 
the detriment of pan-Arab solidarity. Moreover, 
it undermined the Syrian regime, something that 
was not acceptable for Iran. In a very short span 
of time, Iran decided to support the Assad regime 
in Syria at all costs. With its military intervention 
in Syria, Hezbollah turned from pan-Arab heroes 
into a factional sectarian movement fighting as a 
proxy for Iran. 2012 was the year when the deep 
changes in the geostrategic relations of the Middle 
East, at work since 1979, accelerated and became 
irreversible. A broad Shia coalition led by Iran was 
fighting a profoundly divided Sunni Arab array 
of opposed elements, including radical jihadists 
and terrorists (Daesh), already defeated Muslim 
Brothers, conservative Salafis and Wahhabis, and 
authoritarian states (Saudi Arabia, Egypt).
A final element of importance was the broadening 
of the concept of “Shia”. Iranian influence slowly 
penetrated the non-Twelver religious minorities. 
These used to identify with secular Arab 
nationalism, but when this pan-Arabism came 
into crisis they were confronted with the hostility 
of Sunni radicals who considered them heretics. 
At the end of the 1970s, when Hafez el Asad was 
looking for some “Muslim” credentials on the 
eve of his fight against the Muslim Brothers, no 
Sunni religious institutions would agree to deliver 
a certificate of “membership” in the ummah to the 
Alawis. Only Musa Sadr in Lebanon recognized 
the Alawis as Shia Muslims. In the wake of the 
alliance forged between Iran and Syria, certain 
Shia clerics endeavoured to “shiitize” the Alawis. 
The neighbourhood around the grave of Sidnayya 
Zeynab in Damascus became a “Twelver” enclave, 
the place where the Lebanese sheikh Fadlallah 
opened his howza.
Simultaneously, Iran launched a campaign in 
the direction of the Turkish Alevis, who had 
already been the target of terrorist activities (the 
massacres of Sivas and Marash in the 1980s). Later, 
the Houthist movement in Yemen allied with Iran 
after 2011 and started to show more willingness to 
identify not so much with Zaïdism as with Shiism 
in general. In a word, the presumption that Shias 
could be an Iranian fifth column became a self-
fulfilling prophecy, despite the fact that most of 
the Arab Shias, with the exception of Hezbollah, 
do not really identify with Iran but are constrained 
to do so by both internal factors (the religious 
awakening) and geostrategic pressure (they have 
no other real ally than Iran).
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CONCLUSIONS
This polarization between Shias and Sunnis has 
brought the Gulf emirates and monarchies back 
into the fold of Saudi Arabia. The problem is that 
the Saudi leadership of the anti-Iran coalition 
might exacerbate the religious dimension of the 
divide, because the Wahhabi clergy qualify the 
Shias as heretics, thus giving a purely religious 
dimension to the new geo-strategic alignment. The 
few endeavours to shape a Sunni coalition under a 
less religious and more political mobilization have 
failed; for instance, during the Arab spring Qatar 
tried to play a specific Sunni card by supporting 
the Muslim Brothers, who never accused the Shias 
of being heretics, but their crushing defeat in 
Egypt put all the Muslim Brothers of the Middle 
East on the defensive. The increased tensions with 
Iran put the Gulf States, which are geographically 
closer to Iran than Saudi Arabia, on the front line.
They may fear being drawn into too direct a 
confrontation with Iran, a confrontation which 
may have already started in Yemen, as it is the 
first time that a Saudi-led coalition has directly 
intervened in a regional conflict by sending troops 
on the ground. This is a big shift from war by proxy, 
which was the favourite tool of Saudi policy until 
the coming into power of the new King Salman.
The first states to be fragilized by the religious 
interpretation of the conflict between Iran and 
Saudi Arabia are of course Kuwait and Bahrain, 
because of the presence of huge Shia populations. 
Oman cannot buy the “excommunication” of the 
Shias in the name of defence of Sunnism. But 
Saudi Arabia itself is not immune: the discrete 
endeavours of the monarchy to mend fences with 
the Saudi Shia community during the 1990s are 
in jeopardy. The religious divide is not the cause 
of the conflict between a coalition led by Saudi 
Arabia and the pro-Iran axis; nevertheless, the 
exacerbation of religious mobilization makes 
it harder to find domestic political settlements 
(in Yemen for instance) and to find a diplomatic 
solution to the crisis.
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INTRODUCTION
The prominence of transnational identities 
has been one of the main features of the Arab 
uprisings that started in late 2010. While all the 
uprisings were driven by local grievances and the 
protesters were careful to initially use local and 
national slogans, in most cases the transnational 
dimension became central, particularly after the 
harsh security responses and the failure of some 
of the democratic experiments (such as in Egypt). 
But has this transnational dimension undermined 
the importance of the state as a key actor and 
as the form of government these transnational 
movements aspire to? Or are movements such as 
Islamic State merely replicating many of the forms 
of governance that have characterised Middle 
Eastern states for decades? 
PAN-ARAB OR PAN-ISLAMIC? 
Transnational identities during the Arab uprisings 
took many different forms; they were first of 
all pan-Arab, ensuring that the protests spread 
from one Arab country to another, driven by a 
pan-Arab public sphere of largely Gulf-funded 
satellite channels and social media.1 Most Arabs 
1 This does not mean that this pan-Arab public sphere 
has the same goals as earlier pan-Arabist movements, 
i.e. the unification of the Arab countries. But some of 
the legacies of pan-Arabism, such as a common public 
sphere in the form of mass media, a sense of together-
ness and the idea that events in one Arab country impact 
on another, were key to explaining the rapid spread of 
the Arab uprisings. 
felt intricately connected to the events and started 
to hold strong opinions about them. The Arab 
uprisings were also of great interest to the global 
Left, which hoped that the revolutions in the Arab 
world were genuine social revolutions against 
right-wing dictatorships that could usher in a 
better era for the peoples of the Middle East and 
inspire transformations in other parts of the world. 
Leftist groups were key in the protest movements 
in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen and beyond. It 
was also no coincidence that Tahrir (Liberation) 
became a key term used at the Occupy protests in 
America and Europe. 
But the appeal of the uprisings was in part also 
pan-Islamic, in the sense that Muslims around 
the world started to pay even closer attention to 
developments in the Middle East and become 
emotionally involved, particularly after the start 
of the Syrian revolution. The Muslim Brotherhood 
seemed best positioned to profit from this pan-
Islamic sentiment. It has branches in most Arab and 
Islamic countries, and won elections in Egypt and 
Tunisia, and thus became empowered throughout 
the region. After the Gulf-backed coup in the 
summer of 2013 against former Egyptian president 
Morsi, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, the 
future of the most popular transnational Sunni 
Islamist movement which embraced elections as 
a means to attain power is uncertain. As a result, 
more violent Sunni Islamist movements, which 
equally play on transnational Islamic identities, 
have gained traction.
SECTARIAN TRANSNATIONAL IDENTITIES
At the regional level, the most important 
transnational identities that became key were 
tribal and sectarian. Transnational religious 
identities largely followed the schism between the 
various forms of Sunni Islam and the different 
branches of Shiism. For example, the doctrinal 
differences between the different forms of Shiism, 
such as the Alawites, Zaidis and Twelver Shia, are 
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substantial. Nevertheless, in today’s great game for 
regional hegemony these doctrinal and historical 
differences seem to have become less important, 
and various non-Sunni groups are cooperating 
more closely than before. This is happening 
partly under pressure from Iran, which is trying 
to homogenise Shiism and extend its influence 
amongst Shia communities around the world. The 
alliance of the Assad regime in Syria, and to a lesser 
extent the Houthi movement in Yemen, with Iran 
is firstly tactical and political and only secondly 
religious. However, in the wake of war and with 
the empowerment of extreme anti-Shia forces 
such as Islamic State, a religious consolidation 
within Shiism seems to be slowly taking place. 
Hizbullah’s intervention on the side of the regime 
in the Syrian conflict was a symbolic reminder of 
this, and it has contributed to the sectarianisation 
of both Syria and Lebanon.
Sunni Muslims, too, were initially divided across 
ideological (and doctrinal) lines and disagreed 
over whether the Arab uprisings were to be 
embraced or staved off. However, increasingly, 
and particularly since King Salman came to power 
in Saudi Arabia in January 2015, an effort has been 
made to unite different Sunni political movements, 
including the Muslim Brotherhood, in order to 
confront Iran and what the Gulf Arabs perceive 
as Iranian proxies.2 As such, the regional civil war 
based on transnational sectarian identities is not 
set to stop any time soon. Instead, transnational 
sectarian identities are becoming more polarised 
and more rigid across the region. 
The tribal connections between Syria, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, and between Saudi 
Arabia and Yemen, have also become politicised 
2 See, for example, T. Matthiesen, The domestic sources 
of Saudi foreign policy: Islamists and the state in 
the wake of the Arab Uprisings (Washington, D.C.: 




and can explain some of the support that Kuwaitis 
and Saudis (and other Gulf nationals) have given 
to militant groups in Syria and Iraq, and why these 
groups are now a real threat to Gulf security. Often, 
tribal ties overlap with the networks of (mainly 
Sunni) Islamist political movements. 
THE FAILURE OF THE MIDDLE EASTERN 
STATE PROJECT
The breakdown of states in the region and the rise 
of trans- and subnational loyalties has sometimes 
been explained with reference to the notion that 
these states were invented after World War 1 and 
were not built on a “genuine” feeling of national 
destiny or belonging. There is some truth in this. 
Nevertheless, all nations are invented and imagined, 
and most Middle Eastern states have used all the 
means at their disposal to create national identities 
for the best part of a century, and have taught their 
version of national history in schools, created 
national myths, and often fought wars to honour 
these myths.3 Therefore, the notion that Middle 
Eastern states are “artificial” is over-simplistic. 
Instead, trans- and subnational identities, which 
for a long time were not necessarily at odds with 
each other or with the nationalist narratives, have 
now become salient for a number of reasons. 
First of all, states have in many ways failed to 
live up to the expectations of their citizens and 
to deliver on promises of development and 
progress. The Middle Eastern state is a classic 
centralist state, imposing its preferred version of 
language, culture, religion and national identity 
on peripheral regions, which often received little 
in return and remained marginalised. Take the 
case of Aleppo, for example, which was one of 
the most important trading centres of the Middle 
East until its integration into the Syrian nation 
state. The new borders cut it off from its natural 
3 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the 
Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 2nd ed. (London: 
Verso, 1991). 
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hinterland and the Damascene elite ensured that 
Damascus became the unrivalled capital of the 
country. These unequal and exploitative centre-
periphery relations inflamed subnational and 
transnational identities across the region. It is no 
coincidence that many of the uprisings started at 
the marginalised periphery: in Sidi Bouzid, Deraa, 
Awamiya and hundreds of other small towns 
and villages. In the eyes of many people outside 
the patronage networks of the state, the state 
institutions were so corrupt and transgressive 
that the state itself lost much of its legitimacy. 
For others who depended on state patronage, the 
battle became all about saving the institutions that 
fed them and their families, and about crushing 
the protest movements that wanted to reform or 
dismantle these same institutions. Thus, it is to a 
large extent the failure of governance in Middle 
Eastern states that led to the rise of identity politics 
after the Arab uprisings. 
In addition, regional conflicts have politicised 
transnational identities that previously were not 
primarily political, but social, cultural or spiritual 
(such as religious identities in the age of Arab 
nationalism). Authoritarian rulers had for decades 
manipulated and inflamed sectarian, tribal and 
regional differences in order to stay in power, and 
delegitimised potential opponents by accusing 
them of maintaining transnational ties “to outside 
powers”. This stigmatisation of movements that 
sought to highlight legitimate grievances and the 
crushing of all dissent in the name of national 
security has turned the “threat” of transnational 
ties into a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
The regional rivalry between Iran and Saudi 
Arabia, both of which use sectarian identities to 
further their geopolitical goals, has been crucial 
in this regard. Certainly, the sectarianisation of 
the Bahrain uprising and the bloody trajectory 
of the Syrian revolution from national uprising 
to a situation where extreme sectarian groups 
like Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamic State are leading 
the fight against the regime, and are threatening 
the survival of a whole range of religious groups, 
have inflamed sectarian tensions all across the 
Middle East, and indeed beyond. This is becoming 
particularly evident on social media, where 
initially activists broadly supported all the Arab 
uprisings. After a while, however, sectarianism 
and ideology started to divide the Arab publics. 
By and large, Shia Muslims came to not support 
the Syrian revolutionaries, but to cheer for their 
co-religionists in Bahrain and the Saudi Eastern 
Province. Sunni Muslims, on the other hand, were 
suspicious of the latter two protest movements, 
but were very vocal in their support for the Syrian 
cause.4 
ISLAMIC STATE AND THE CALIPHATE 
Transnational Islamic identities therefore became 
as much a source of unity as of division. A whole 
range of transnational Islamic movements claimed 
to be the legitimate heirs of the Arab uprisings. 
Islamic State has emerged as one of the most 
forceful of these groups, not least because its aim 
to establish a caliphate has activated yet another 
powerful transnational narrative that appeals to 
Muslims around the world. There have long been 
Islamic movements seeking to preserve or re-
establish the caliphate abolished in 1924, from the 
Khilafat movement in India to Hizb ut-Tahrir, the 
global Islamist movement with a strong presence in 
Asia. However, most Islamist movements deemed 
the caliphate a distant goal that could only re-
emerge under certain ideal conditions, and instead 
wanted to focus on building an Islamic state (al-
dawla al-islamiyya). Before renaming itself just 
“Islamic State”, the group was known as The Islamic 
State in Iraq and al-Sham. The intellectual leap of 
the group has then been to merge the discourses of 
the utopian Islamic state and the caliphate which 
4 M. Lynch, “Rethinking nations in the Middle East”, 
Washington Post, 2 June 2015, http://www.washington-
post.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/06/02/rethink-
ing-nations-in-the-middle-east. 
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have been prevalent in a whole range of Islamic 
contexts for decades and to try to implement them 
in a specific territory, Iraq and al-Sham. They have 
even managed to incorporate the discourse of 
Greater Syrian nationalism, of bilad al-Sham. The 
notion of unifying bilad al-Sham, a geographical 
designation that broadly corresponds to the 
“Levant”, i.e. Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan 
and parts of Iraq, has been the aim of Syrian 
nationalists. Its name therefore symbolises the 
territorial aspirations of Islamic State. It is this 
combination of a ruthless state-building project 
with a revolutionary transnational identity, indeed 
a new internationalism, that has so far ensured its 
success. 
Islamic State has answered the question whether 
the Sykes-Picot agreement, the line drawn up by 
French and British diplomats during the First 
World War to divide the Middle East, which 
defined the boundaries of the post-Ottoman 
Arab states, is still relevant. De facto it is not, 
even though it still dominates official maps and 
minds, but the new polities that are emerging 
resemble the old ones in many ways, and many of 
the sub- and transnational movements that want 
to establish a state mainly seek to redraw the map 
of the Middle East, not fundamentally change the 
laws of politics. 
THE KURDS AND THE ARAB SHIA 
Kurdish nationalism is a case in point. It seeks to 
unite all Kurds (mainly from Iraq, Syria, Turkey and 
Iran) in a Greater Kurdistan. In many ways, it will 
be the success or, more likely, eventual failure of the 
policies of the states that now contain significant 
Kurdish populations that will determine the fate 
of the Kurdish nationalist project. The fallout 
from the Arab uprisings has certainly given this 
project new momentum. However, the Kurdish 
state envisioned by Kurdish nationalists is a classic 
Middle Eastern state, based on ethnic nationalism, 
with hostile neighbours, worries about regime 
security, an economy based on natural resources 
and an elite that came of age in times of war and 
has been accused of corruption. 
The situation of the Arab Shia is also related to the 
developments above. The Shia-led government 
of Iraq has been unable to reach a mutually 
beneficial agreement with the Kurds, and is facing 
difficulties in convincing Iraq’s Sunnis in the areas 
under Islamic State control that the Iraqi nation 
state is a better alternative for them than Islamic 
State. However, the rise of the Iraqi Shia since 
2003 together with the Arab uprisings have had 
profound impacts on another group of Arab Shia: 
those that live in the Gulf (mainly in Bahrain, Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait). Bahraini and Saudi Shia have 
taken to the streets to demand more rights since 
2011, while Kuwaiti Shia have by and large backed 
the ruling family and even supported a crackdown 
on the largely Sunni tribal and Islamist opposition 
there. 
The diverging trajectories of the Shia in the Gulf 
show that it is still the national context that shapes 
the local strategic decisions of transnational 
political actors. There have been attempts by Gulf 
Shia to write the Shia into national historiographies 
and into the national consciousness. Because 
Arab Shia are a majority in Bahrain and they 
see themselves as the original inhabitants of the 
island, it was fairly straightforward for Shia actors 
there to embrace a language of nationalism and 
inclusiveness, because these actors can reasonably 
hope to play a key role in the country one day. 
In Saudi Arabia, where Shia make up about 10-
15% of the citizen population, after a period of 
confrontation in the 1970s and 1980s the main 
Shia actors have tried to engage with the ruling 
family and with wider Saudi society. They have 
thus raised the visibility of the Shia in the kingdom, 
even though institutionalised discrimination 
remains an issue.5 
5 For more see T. Matthiesen, The Other Saudis: Shiism, 
Dissent and Sectarianism (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2015).
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However, since the start of the Arab uprisings the 
notion of a transnational connection between these 
Gulf Shia has again become more important. This 
has been spurred by increased sectarian tensions 
at the regional level and the discrimination and 
repression that the Bahraini and Saudi Shia face in 
particular. There is a sense that these transnational 
connections amongst Gulf Shia relate to the 
notion of the imagined community that was once 
“Ancient Bahrain”, when the Gulf coast from 
Basra down to Qatar was united in one single 
polity. In the Bahraini and Eastern Province case, 
there is a sense that this is also associated with a 
shared descent and a shared religious affiliation, 
which makes it similar to ethnic nationalism. The 
project that a number of opposition groups seek 
to implement is that of “Greater Bahrain”, unifying 
Bahrain with Qatif and al-Ahsa in the Saudi Eastern 
Province and perhaps areas beyond. Needless to 
say, this is anathema to the Gulf governments and 
Sunnis in the Gulf, many of whom instead favour 
supporting Arab separatists in Iran’s Gulf province 
of al-Ahwaz.
ETHNIC CLEANSING
In several multi-religious societies, and particularly 
where the Sunni-Shia split is of relevance, there is 
a real threat of mass displacements and killings 
based on sectarian or ethnic lines. In some places, 
such ethnic cleansing has already occurred (for 
example in the case of the Yezidi Kurds in Iraq). 
The longer the wars in Syria and Iraq go on, the 
more areas will be split into “Sunni” and “Shia” 
territories. Minorities will probably mainly seek 
refuge in “Shia” and Kurdish areas. Recently, 
Islamic State has vowed to expand its strategy 
of ethnic cleansing outside Iraq and Syria. The 
Saudi (Najd) branch of Islamic State has started a 
deadly bombing campaign against Shia in the Gulf 
with the declared aim of purifying the Arabian 
Peninsula of the “rejectionists” (a pejorative way 
of referring to Shia).  
CONCLUSION
While the transnationalism that has emerged 
so strongly in the Middle East is in many ways 
an attempt to create new nation states based on 
ethnicity and/or religion, this does not make it 
less threatening to existing Middle Eastern states. 
It is beyond doubt that these movements seek to 
profoundly redraw the map of the Middle East, and 
they may well succeed. However, what may look 
new is not necessarily original. The new political 
entities such as Islamic State are replicating many 
of the practices that the corrupt, brutal and 
authoritarian rentier states of the Middle East 
have used for decades. Therefore, their eventual 
success in “governing” the populations under their 
control may be limited, as they will face many of 
the same problems that have bedevilled Middle 
Eastern states for a century, and that eventually 
led to the Arab uprisings.6 While transnational 
identities have certainly become more important 
in the Middle East, nationalism, and particularly 
the notion of the nation state, have not yet become 
obsolete. 
6 Tripp, “IS: the rentier caliphate with no new ideas”, 
Al-Araby, 8 February, 2015, http://www.alaraby.co.uk/
english/politics/2015/2/8/is-the-rentier-caliphate-with-
no-new-ideas.
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INTRODUCTION
The international agreement on Iran’s nuclear 
programme between the P5+1 (Britain, China, 
France, Russia and the United States, plus 
Germany) and Iran on 14 July 2015 was reached 
while Saudi Arabia, Egypt and four of their other 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) allies were 
engaged in a large-scale air campaign codenamed 
Operation Decisive Storm against the Houthis in 
Yemen – a conflict which resulted in more than 
5,200 deaths as of 29 September, and more than 
21 million people (80 percent of the population) 
in need of humanitarian assistance and with no 
access to safe water.1 This sequence of events has 
taken place while manipulation of the sectarian 
card has underpinned policy responses to the 
Arab Spring in the region and only heightened 
tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Moreover, 
conflicting dynamics have been at play within 
the GCC since 2011. Fundamental divergences 
over the Muslim Brotherhood issue, and the 
post-Arab Spring Middle East in general, led to 
increasing tensions between Qatar and Saudi 
Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain. However, all the 
GCC monarchies have shown strong cohesion in 
dealing with internal peaceful protests, including 
on the occasion of the military intervention in 
Bahrain in 2011. 
1 United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, “Yemen Humanitarian Bulletin 
No. 3,” 29 September 2015 (available at: http://bit.
ly/1LDxJnl, checked on 12 October 2015).
In this context, this chapter analyses the 
relationship between the Gulf monarchies and Iran 
after 2011, which has been marked by a regional 
struggle for influence between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran. This confrontation has plunged West Asia 
(and in particular, Yemen, Iraq and Syria) into the 
situation it is in today, and is also characterised 
by notable divergences of views and (political and 
economic) interests among the GCC states when 
dealing with Iran and the latter’s future role in the 
region.
The GCC was created in 1981 with the aim of 
“achieving unity” and formulating common 
regulations in fields including economics, 
customs, commerce, education and culture. The 
fact that the six monarchies share similar political 
systems and international allies and have survived 
similar challenges to their rule (Arab nationalism, 
socialism and revolutionary Islamism, to mention 
only a few) has been the most solid cement 
keeping the GCC alive. However, deep-founded 
divisions and power imbalances within the council 
led to it being largely unproductive over the first 
three decades of its existence. One of the best 
illustrations of this has been the single currency. 
The Gulf Monetary Council was established on 
27 March 2010, but progress towards monetary 
integration has been negligible: Oman left in 2007 
and the UAE stormed out of the project in 2009. 
Even on security issues, structural divergences of 
views have impeded the emergence of a common 
line. While Saudi Arabia (and more recently Qatar) 
has been funding Islamist groups and militants 
abroad since the 1980s, this has been a cause for 
concern in other GCC capitals, which are worried 
about a long-term boomerang effect on their own 
internal stability. More recently, Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates and Bahrain have accused 
Qatar of interfering in their domestic affairs and 
supporting local Muslim Brotherhood cells.
At the beginning of 2011, when it became clear 
that protests would not only take place in Egypt 
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and Tunisia but in the Gulf too, all the GCC ruling 
families agreed that they did not intend to go 
beyond what they fundamentally considered a 
red line, i.e. keeping the centre of political power 
(encompassing the executive and the legislative 
power) as their personal prerogative closed off 
from contestation. The potential scenario of a 
regional unbalancing of power driven by a lack 
of support from external allies (the overthrow 
of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt was often used as an 
example) led the GCC countries to temporarily 
set aside their differences and to find solutions 
together. All the GCC countries (even those which 
did not send troops) supported the Peninsula 
Shield intervention in Bahrain in 2011. The 
Bahraini authorities worked desperately to depict 
the uprising as a sectarian movement.2 This was 
done by not only blaming Iran for its supposed 
interference in the island’s internal affairs, but also 
by targeting activists on a sectarian basis. All the 
GCC rulers signed up, explicitly or implicitly, to 
the narrative that Iran was behind the protests. 
Obviously, this blame game served the purposes 
of the GCC’s ruling families, which by branding 
the protests as an exogenous product sought to 
avoid having to face indigenous grievances. In 
addition, the GCC countries coordinated financial 
aid to help Oman and Bahrain cope with the Arab 
Spring (an aid package worth US$ 20bn) in March 
2011.
However, this support for its weakest links (Oman 
and Bahrain) was not the first step towards 
a strengthening of the ties between the GCC 
countries that Saudi Arabia may have hoped. In 
late 2011, King ‘Abd Allah of Saudi Arabia put 
forward a plan to create a Gulf Union which would 
co-operate on foreign policy and defence, as well 
as on trade and currency. The idea was supported 
by Bahrain – but only Bahrain. The other states all 
2 For a study of the manipulation of sectarian identities by 
the Bahraini and Saudi regimes during the Arab Spring, 
see T. Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi 
Arabia, and the Arab Spring That Wasn’t (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2013).
have had objections, due not only to their fear that 
such a structure could increase Saudi ambitions 
to dominate the smaller GCC states but also to 
their divergent priorities in foreign policy. While 
Qatar gave support to the Muslim Brotherhood, 
infuriating Saudi Arabia, strong reservations 
about the union were voiced in Kuwait in the name 
of preservation of the country’s parliamentary 
system, and in the UAE. Oman went even further 
and in November 2013 declared that it would not 
prevent the upgrading of the GCC into a union of 
six countries but would “not be part of it” if it were 
to happen.3
DIVERGENCES OF VIEWS TOWARD IRAN
While the creation of the GCC had its raison 
d’être as a reaction to the Islamic revolution in 
Iran and the Iran-Iraq war, overall a heterogenic 
combination of shared interests and shared 
concerns, suspicion and familiarity, ideological 
and geopolitical contrasts and pragmatism leaves 
the GCC with a confused attitude vis-à-vis Tehran. 
The approach of a number of GCC rulers remains 
marked by Iran’s foreign policy of exporting the 
Islamic revolution in the 1980s and suspicion 
(varying over time) of Tehran’s interference in the 
Gulf monarchies’ domestic politics in support of 
local Shi‘i minorities. While this perceived threat 
posed by Iran to the GCC countries’ internal 
stability does not impede some common narrative 
about Iran, it is not shared to the same extent and 
in the same way by the monarchies, which explains 
their different attitudes toward Tehran. While 
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have been the states 
in the GCC least open to Iran’s recent tentative 
3 This was the second such statement by Oman, following 
the Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusuf bin 
‘Alawi’s clarification in June 2012 that “the GCC union 
does not exist” and “subsists only among journalists” 
(H. al-Hina’i and E. al-Shidi, “Yusuf bin ‘Alawi: “La 
yujad ittihad”… wa-l-lajna “intahat” [Yusuf bin ‘Alawi: 
“The Union Does Not Exist”… and the Committee 
“Ended”], ‘Uman, 3 June 2012: 13).
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international rehabilitation – viewing the United 
States’ rapprochement with Iran as a zero-sum 
game which could impact their own partnership 
with Washington – Oman has been the most open. 
The multidimensionality in the relations between 
the GCC monarchies and Iran is best exemplified 
by the UAE’s relationship with Iran.
Because of Dubai’s regional role as a re-export 
hub and its massive Iranian business community,4 
the UAE was the second most affected country, 
after Iran itself, by international sanctions 
against Tehran. Between 2009 and 2014, business 
between the countries plunged by 83% 5 On the 
other hand, Abu Dhabi, which has branded Iran 
a threat to stability and national security since 
Tehran’s seizure in 1971 of the three islands of 
Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunbs,6 has for 
long been one of the most intransigent vis-à-vis 
the concessions made in the nuclear negotiations. 
In 2010, the UAE ambassador to Washington, 
Yusef al-‘Otaiba, publicly endorsed the possibility 
of military action against Iran.7 Following the 
2009 financial crisis and the rescue of Dubai by 
a $20 billion bailout from Abu Dhabi, Dubai had 
no other choice than to rigorously comply with 
sanction measures on commercial transactions 
and smuggling with Iran.
Of all the GCC members, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain 
demonstrate the most wariness and distrust 
toward Iran and the possibility of ending Tehran’s 
isolation. To this is added the rivalry since 1979 
4 More than 10,000 firms in the emirate have Iranian 
ownership, according to Dubai’s Iranian Business 
Council. Ethnic Iranians account for 15 percent of its 
population (L. al-Nahhas, “Iran Merchants in Dubai 
Eagerly Await Sanctions Relief,” Agence France-Presse, 
14 July 2015).
5 J. Tirone, I. Lakshmanan and K. Foroohar, “Iran Nuclear 
Deal Leaves Obama, Rouhani Seeking Support,” 
Bloomberg Business, 25 November 2013.
6 All the GCC countries support the UAE’s claim on the 
islands.
7 E. Lake, “U.A.E. Diplomat Mulls Hit on Iran’s Nukes,” 
Washington Times, 6 July 2010.
between monarchic Saudi Arabia and republican 
Iran for the political-religious leadership in the 
Muslim world and for regional hegemony in 
the post-Arab Spring Middle East. Saudi and 
Bahraini leaders frequently refer to the crucial 
role played by Iran in the early 1980s in organising 
the political arm of the Shirazi movement in the 
Gulf monarchies, and in particular to the plot 
against Bahrain’s ruling dynasty in December 
1981 by the Islamic Front for the Liberation of 
Bahrain. In 2008, according to State Department 
cables released by WikiLeaks, King ‘Abd Allah 
urged the United States to strike in Iran and spoke 
of the need to “cut off the head of the [Iranian] 
snake.”8 During the 2011 popular peaceful protests 
in Bahrain, the Iranian card, and Iran’s alleged 
local supporters like the al-Wifaq political society, 
were used as a foil to convince both the Sunnis 
and secular Shi‘a in Bahrain and the international 
community that the current regime, despite being 
authoritarian, was the lesser of two evils. This went 
with the development of a very anti-Iranian and 
(anti-Shi‘i) rhetoric in many Saudi and Bahraini, 
but also Kuwaiti and Emirati, media.
The Shi‘a in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have long 
been perceived as having a historical experience 
of discrimination and deprivation of social 
opportunities, while the situation of their co-
religionists in the other Gulf monarchies offers 
a very different picture. In Kuwait, the United 
Arab Emirates and Oman, wealthy Shi‘i families 
play a prominent role in the economic and 
financial systems of the state and even enjoy top 
political positions. These three regimes have 
been less inclined than their Bahraini and Saudi 
counterparts to see Iranian Trojan horses in 
their domestic Shi‘i minority. Shi‘i groups in 
Kuwait, Oman and the UAE have been invaluable 
allies of the rulers throughout the twentieth and 
8 “Saudi King Abdullah and Senior Princes on 
Saudi Policy Towards Iraq,” US Diplomatic Cable 
08RIYADH649_a (available at: https://wikileaks.org/
plusd/cables/08RIYADH649_a.html).
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twenty-first centuries, and have vested interests in 
maintaining the existing political order.
At the other end of the spectrum, Sultan Qaboos 
of Oman has always considered that there is no 
long-term alternative to peaceful coexistence 
between the two shores of the Gulf. Oman did not 
cease diplomatic relations with Tehran after the 
Islamic Revolution in 1979 and from the creation 
of the GCC was hostile to any transformation 
of the organisation into an anti-Iran coalition.9 
Not only has Muscat contended that the Iranian 
government in its current form is here to stay 
but it has also rejected the idea that Iran poses a 
fundamental threat to the region. The sultanate 
considers that it has no reason not to believe Iran’s 
assurances that its nuclear programme has purely 
civilian purposes.10 As a consequence, according 
to Omani officials, political and military threats 
posed by Iran to the GCC states can only be 
deterred by cooperation and de-escalation. Oman 
also played an important role in facilitating the 
conclusion of the Iran-P5+1 nuclear deal in 
November 2013. When this was signed, the US 
media revealed that secret meetings between US 
and Iranian officials had taken place in Muscat 
since March 2013.
The Omani attitude towards Iran is compounded 
by their sharing of the sovereignty of the Strait of 
Hormuz, through which approximately one-third 
of the world’s sea-borne trade in crude petroleum 
passed in 2014. In August 2010 the two countries 
signed a defence co-operation agreement in 
which in particular they agreed to hold joint 
military exercises and to increase their exchange 
of border intelligence and information. Under 
this security pact, the Iranian and Omani navies 
held joint military exercises in the Sea of Oman 
9 J. Townsend, “Le sultanat d’Oman; vers la fin d’un 
particularisme séculaire ?”Maghreb-Machrek, n.94 
(1981).
10 Oman’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Positions of 
the Sultanate,” 22 September 2013 (Available at: http://
www.mofa.gov.om/?cat=124&lang=en).
in April 2014 for the fourth consecutive year. In 
Tehran in October 2014, the defence ministers 
of the two countries signed a new memorandum 
of understanding intended to tackle drug and 
human trafficking and to serve as a framework 
for closer military cooperation in the future. 
In May 2015, Oman’s Minister Responsible for 
Foreign Affairs Yusuf bin ‘Alawi and his Iranian 
counterpart Muhammad Javad Zarif announced 
the countries had demarcated a 450-km section 
of their maritime border that had not previously 
been defined.
Sultan Qaboos’s eternal gratitude for the Shah’s 
decisive military effort during the Dhofar war has 
also clearly been a crucial factor here. No other 
state in the region (apart from Jordan) played 
a comparable role in helping Sultan Qaboos at 
that time. Last but not least, Oman’s increasing 
dependence on Iran for gas has given it a particular 
interest in maintaining good relations. A 25-year 
gas deal valued at around USD60 billion has been 
signed, according to which Iran will supply ten 
billion cubic meters of gas annually to Oman via a 
350km pipeline linking southern Iran to the port 
of Sohar.
Like Oman, Qatar’s policy towards Iran has been 
determined by the consideration that it has no 
interest in presenting Iran as the sole source of 
regional tensions and that “maintaining a healthy 
relationship with Iran […] is of paramount 
strategic importance.”11 This is explained by the 
sharing of the North Dome/South Pars field, the 
world’s largest gas field, the exploitation of which 
has been crucial to Qatar’s prosperity for the last 
twenty years. Qatar’s public welcoming of the 
Iran-P5+1 nuclear deal in July 2015 has its roots 
in its long-term vital strategic interests in keeping 
a friendly relationship with Tehran, even though 
11 F. Ayub, “Introduction,” in “Post-Nuclear: The Future 
for Iran in its Neighbourhood,” European Council on 
Foreign Relations, December 2014: 4 (Available at:
http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR120_GULF_ANALYSIS.
pdf)
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until recently it has been devoid of substantial 
cooperation. Another factor explaining Qatar’s 
desire to maintain a cordial relationship has to 
do with the fear that tensions with Iran may 
induce Sunni-Shi‘i frictions inside the country, 
although the Shi‘a, which represent 10 percent 
of Qatari nationals, have no past record of 
participation in opposition movements and enjoy 
religious freedom. The creation of a Joint Free 
Economic Area in the Iranian region of Bushehr 
was announced in July 2014 and the two parties 
insisted on their readiness to invest in linking the 
ports of Bushehr in Iran and al-Ruwais in Qatar.
With a large Shi‘i minority (estimated at 20-25 
percent of its population) historically composed of 
merchant classes close to the ruling family, but also 
a significant presence of Sunni political groups and 
individuals suspected of funding jihadism in Syria 
and Iraq, Kuwait sees no point in making an enemy 
of Iran either. While Kuwait has had to be more 
receptive to Saudi fears regarding Iran than Oman 
and Qatar have been, the Kuwaiti Emir’s visit to 
Iran in May 2014, the first such by a Kuwaiti ruler 
since 1979, was interpreted as an effort to mediate 
between Tehran and Riyadh. On this occasion, 
Kuwaiti officials suggested that “Gulf countries’ 
links with Iran should be on a bilateral level, not 
as a bloc,”12 which is something welcomed by 
Iran but that Saudi Arabia wants to avoid like the 
plague. President Rouhani and Emir Sabah issued 
a joint statement in which they “expressed their 
satisfaction over the march of bilateral relations” 
and described the visit as a “turning point in the 
relations between the two nations,”13 following the 
signing of several trade and security agreements 
and memoranda of understanding.
12 A. Hammond, “The United Arab Emirates, Qatar, 
Oman, and Kuwait: The Gulf Front Weakens,” in ibid.: 
15. 
13 “Kuwait, Iran Vow Joint Work to Develop Ties,” Kuwait 
News Agency (KUNA), 2 June 2014.
THE SAUDI CLAIM FOR REGIONAL 
HEGEMONY
On the occasion of the Camp David summit with 
the GCC countries in May 2015, US President 
Barack Obama worked hard to reassure his allies 
over the Iranian nuclear deal, since the possibility 
of a grand bargain at the expense of the Arab 
monarchies was a cause of concern in various 
GCC capitals. The conclusion of an agreement on 
the Iranian nuclear issue indeed conceals a great 
deal of anxiety, in Riyadh in particular. Together 
with Israel, Saudi Arabia is the country that most 
actively tried to delay the talks and lobbied against 
the agreement. The Saudi leadership, together with 
the Bahraini one, fears that loosening sanctions 
will enable Tehran to become more confident in the 
regional arena and push its influence – in a word, 
to challenge Saudi Arabia’s sphere of influence in 
the Gulf and wider West Asia. However Iranian 
foreign policy has no longer anything to do with 
its foreign policy of the 1980s which concentrated 
on exportation of the Islamic Revolution.
A key determinant of Iranian foreign policy after 
the Islamic Revolution – and to a large extent, until 
now – has been its resistance to the United States 
and to its allies in the Middle East. In order to 
achieve these goals, Iran has been providing direct 
military and financial support to allied groups or 
parties, either because they have been sympathetic 
to Iran’s geopolitical goals (e.g. Bashar al-Assad’s 
regime in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Shi‘i 
militias in Iraq) or because they have opposed 
Iran’s enemies (e.g. Hamas). However, the regime 
of international sanctions imposed on Iran has had 
a significant impact on its foreign policy. Despite 
its revolutionary rhetoric, it has been governed by 
pragmatic more than ideological considerations. 
Mirroring the feeling experienced in various GCC 
capitals toward Iran, a key driver of Iranian foreign 
policy has been the perception of a threat to the 
regime posed by the United States and its allies in 
the name of the country’s national interest but also 
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out of diplomatic isolation. As Mehran Kamrava 
explains, “Iranian foreign policy has been reactive 
at best and filled with empty but unwelcomed 
rhetoric at worst.”14 In particular, frequent 
provocative and absurd statements emerging 
from Tehran15 only fuel regional tensions by 
feeding into the narrative of Iran’s imperialistic 
ambitions, and are in return used to stoke more 
poisonous rhetoric. More generally, Tehran takes 
great delight in relaying information related to the 
harsh repression that has been taking place against 
the Bahraini opposition and Saudi activists from 
the Eastern Province, and in vocally condemning 
the Bahraini and Saudi governments’ handling of 
protests. However, in a context where the velayat-e 
faqih doctrine16 has long ceased to be a guiding 
star, this strategy of adding fuel to the fire has the 
advantage of maintaining much ambiguity about 
its actual capacity for influence. Bahrain and 
Yemen are certainly not Syria and Lebanon; the 
al-Wifaq society, and even the al-Wafa’ movement 
in Bahrain, are certainly not Hezbollah. Despite 
its desperate efforts to portray itself as a regional 
mastermind, because of its diplomatic isolation 
Iran’s political appeal is out of proportion to what 
it may have been in the 1980s, and its nuisance 
capacity is probably more imagined than real.
Yemen, where Iran’s actual role has been anything 
but obvious, has been the perfect example of 
this. Claims that the Houthis were linked to 
Iran can be traced back to 2009, when the Saudi 
forces suffered humiliating setbacks during their 
military incursion into Yemeni territory to fight 
the Houthis. As a convenient way to save face 
14 M. Kamrava, “What Iran Needs to Do Now,” CIRS 
Analysis, 14 April 2015 (available at:
 http://cirs.georgetown.edu/news-cirs/what-iran-needs-do-
now).
15 As exemplified by regular claims from more or less 
senior Iranian officials that Bahrain should be the 
fourteenth province of Iran.
16 Literally “the guardianship of the jurists,” this doctrine 
in Shi‘i Islam is the current political system in Iran and 
gives political leadership to the jurist in Islamic law.
and find a flattering explanation for their more 
than embarrassing incapacity to overcome what 
was not considered more than a tribal militia, 
the Saudi and Yemeni governments repeatedly 
accused Tehran of supporting the Houthis, despite 
the United States’ unambiguous scepticism about 
these allegations.17 While Iranian officials denied 
interference in the war, the Iranian media were not 
shy at celebrating the Houthis’ “heroic resistance” 
– thereby implicitly confirming the accusation 
of Tehran’s support but, more importantly, 
presenting Iran as a key player at little expense. 
Even in 2015, as Gabriele vom Bruck explains, 
the Iranian influence in Yemen is “trivial. The 
Houthis want Yemen to be independent, […] they 
don’t want to be controlled by Saudi Arabia or the 
Americans, and they certainly don’t want to replace 
the Saudis with the Iranians. I don’t think the 
Iranians have influence in their decision-making. 
It’s not a relationship like that between Iran and 
Hezbollah.”18 The last International Crisis Group 
report on Yemen also points out that the Houthis 
“are less dependent on Tehran than Hadi and his 
allies are on Riyadh, but on today’s trajectory, their 
relative self-sufficiency will not last long. They are 
already soliciting Iranian financial and political 
support.”19
In order to legitimise the 2015 military intervention, 
Saudi Arabia has tried to frame it as an Arab 
defence front against Persian expansionism,20 
and also as a Sunni-Shi‘i confrontation (even 
though Pakistan – despite being a strong Saudi 
ally – and Turkey refused any involvement in the 
war, while Egypt was not eager, to say the least, to 
17 B. Whitaker, “Yemen, the US and the Houthis. What the 
Wikileaks Cables Reveal,” al-Bab, 6 April 2015.
18 Quoted in G. Viscusi, P. Donahue and J. Walcott, “Saudi 
Claims on Iran’s Role in Yemen Face Skepticism in 
West,” Bloomberg, 14 April 2015.
19 International Crisis Group, “Yemen at War,” Middle 
East Briefing no.45, 27 March 2015.
20 Despite the fact that Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon, Syria, 
Iraq and Oman, among others, refused to participate in 
the coalition.
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enter the conflict). However, beyond Iran’s actual 
or imagined involvement, the goal of the Saudi-
led military intervention is instead to maintain 
the continuity of authoritarian governance in 
the region by actively repressing the forces that 
threaten to undo the status quo in a weak Yemen. 
By emphasising the security issues, most of those 
present at the Arab League Summit in March 2015 
were mostly eager to turn the page on the Arab 
Spring and its calls for structural political changes. 
CONCLUSION
Beyond this common understanding among GCC 
rulers that cohesion must prevail in a time of 
internal peaceful protests, as exemplified by the 
signature in November 2012 of a GCC security 
pact strengthening cooperation and mutual 
assistance in security matters,21 structural political 
divergences on strategic interests remain. While 
Riyadh writers and leaders continue to promote 
an image of Saudi Arabia as the Big Sister of 
the other monarchies, this unwelcome Saudi 
tutelage has been something that the smaller GCC 
monarchies (except Bahrain, to some extent) have 
been resisting. This contributes to explaining 
why – even though most Gulf regimes remain 
wary of Iran – Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and even 
the UAE all want an improvement in relations, 
and are aware that they have much to gain from 
a nuclear agreement. Not only would any chance 
of an Iranian nuclear weapon be put off, but so 
would Iran’s temptation to exploit and exacerbate 
regional tensions. Iran’s reintegration into the 
international community would hopefully prepare 
the ground for long-term resolutions of crises like 
those in Iraq and Syria which need a combination 
of all regional and international parties, and the 
collateral impacts (like ISIS) of which are vital 
threats for all the GCC monarchies. Last but not 
least, a nuclear deal would make new human, 
security and business exchanges and cooperation 
between the two shores of the Gulf possible again.
21 The pact, which has been ratified by all the regimes 
except Kuwait so far, allows the hunting down of those 
who are outside the law or the system, or who are 
wanted by party states, regardless of their nationalities, 
and the taking of necessary measures against them. It 
also allows the integration of the signatories’ security 
apparatuses to provide support during times of security 
disturbances and unrest in a signatory state. Since 
January 2015, at least three Kuwaiti opposition figures, 
social media activists and heads of political movements 
have been detained at the request of the Saudi authorities 
(cf. M. al-Rasheed, “Kuwaiti Activists Targeted under 
GCC Security Pact,” al-Monitor, 20 March 2015).
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ARTICULATING THE 
NEW GULF COUNTRIES’ 
INTERVENTIONISM: WHAT 
LESSONS CAN BE DRAWN 






On 3 June 2011, President Ali Abdullah Saleh 
of Yemen, struggling to contain a mass uprising 
tentatively referred to as a ‘revolution’, was severely 
injured after an assassination attempt at the 
Presidential Palace in Sana’a. The next day, Saleh 
flew out to the capital of Saudi Arabia, Riyadh, in 
what appeared to many to be the start of an exile 
in Yemen’s oil-rich neighbour.
Even if Saleh wanted to return, it was felt that the 
Saudis would not allow it, especially as several of 
the leading figures opposing Saleh were friendly 
with Saudi Arabia and on the Saudi payroll.1 Saleh 
had not been particularly liked by Saudi Arabia 
over the years.2 Allowing Saleh to return would 
paint Saudi Arabia in a negative light on the 
world stage as an opponent of Yemen’s democratic 
uprising. Moreover, his return would threaten to 
throw Yemen perilously closer to civil war, and an 
unstable Yemen with al-Qaeda militants roaming 
its lawless provinces would not be an attractive 
prospect for the Kingdom. Nevertheless, on 23 
September 2011 after three months in Riyadh, 
Saleh defiantly returned to Sana’a. Saudi Arabia 
1 E. Knickermeyer, “Trouble Down South”, Foreign Pol-
icy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/07/05/
trouble_down_south.
2 P. Dresch, “The Tribal Factor in the Yemeni Crisis,” in 
The Yemeni Crisis of 1994: Causes and Consequences, 
edited by Jamal S. Al-Suwaidi, Saqi Books, 1995, p. 39
had defied the analysts and did not stand in his 
way.
Moving forward to 2015, Saleh still plays a pivotal 
role in Yemen. He is still defiant. However, instead 
of being a friend to Saudi Arabia he stands in 
front of his bombed residence vowing never to 
surrender and berating those who attacked him 
– the Saudis. He has become an enemy of Saudi 
Arabia and an ally of the pro-Iranian Houthi rebel 
group, who the Saudis have vowed not to allow to 
rule Yemen. He still controls several of the most 
powerful Yemeni army units and his forces, along 
with the Houthis, have been pounded by a Saudi-
led coalition since 26 March.
How did the 2011 and 2015 scenarios happen? Why 
did Saudi Arabia allow Saleh to return to Yemen in 
2011, and why are they so virulently opposed to 
him now, turning their military and media arsenal 
against him? Why has Saudi Arabia’s relationship 
with Yemen throughout the 20th century and 
into the 21st century been littered with seemingly 
contradictory and puzzling policies and actions? 
How did Saudi Arabia manage to lose control of 
Saleh and potentially allow the Iranians to gain a 
foothold on their southern border?
All these questions go to the root of Saudi Arabia’s 
relationship with Yemen, one that stretches back 
to the very founding of the modern Saudi state 
in its modern form in 1934. Saudi Arabia is by 
far the most influential external actor in Yemen3 
and its policies there, especially after the end of 
the North Yemeni Civil War in 1970, have largely 
involved balancing different sides against each 
other, attempting to ‘dance on the heads of snakes’, 
as Saleh refers to his own method of controlling 
Yemen.
Saudi Arabia’s role in the 2015 conflict, and to a 
lesser extent in the 2011 uprising, reflects the 
intertwined modern histories of the two countries. 
3 S. Phillips, Sarah, Yemen and the Politics of Permanent 
Crisis, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
2011, p. 75
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Once again, Saudi Arabia seeks to directly counter 
any influence a rival power may have in Yemen, 
with Iran being the case in point today while it 
was Nasser’s Egypt and the Soviet Union in the 
past, and ensure that whoever takes the reins of 
power in Yemen will keep Riyadh’s interests in 
mind. The historical border dispute between the 
two countries, one that goes back to the very 
formation of the modern Saudi state, is also 
reflected in the cross-border raids conducted by 
the Houthis and the propaganda disseminated by 
pro-Houthi groups focusing on the idea that the 
south of Saudi Arabia is part of ‘Greater Yemen’. 
The real difference in the Saudi role today, 
in comparison with the country’s historical 
interventions in Yemen, is its directness and the 
sheer number of air raids conducted, as well as the 
active participation of Saudi ground troops in the 
conflict. This military operation marks something 
new, and could potentially indicate a lack of faith 
in the United States’ preparedness to defend 
Saudi Arabia against Iran, as well as increasingly 
aggressive interventions that perhaps reflect the 
emergence of the younger generation of Saudi 
princes into positions of power. 
AN INTERTWINED HISTORY
The modern histories of Saudi Arabia and Yemen 
are intertwined. The founder of the modern Saudi 
state, King Abdulaziz Ibn Saud, expanded his 
borders at the expense of North Yemen’s Imam 
Yahya by taking the provinces of Asir, Jizan, and 
Najran in the Saudi-Yemeni War of 1934. However, 
by 1948 he was refusing to aid the Imam’s enemies 
as they plotted to overthrow him. The ‘Wahhabi’ 
Sunni Ibn Saud’s sons, King Saud and King Faisal, 
then militarily backed the Zaydi Shia Imamate in 
the Yemeni Civil War of 1962-1970 against the 
predominantly Sunni Republicans – although 
within Yemen the sectarian aspect of this change 
in power was minimal, many of the leading 
revolutionaries being Zaydi.
The Saudi Arabians spent the 1970s and 1980s 
fearing a united Yemen, which they were afraid 
would be dominated by South Yemen’s ruling 
Marxists and Socialists. However, when North 
and South Yemen came together as the Republic 
of Yemen in 1990 under the leadership of the 
North’s Ali Abdullah Saleh, Saudi Arabia worked 
to undermine it, to the extent that it backed the 
same figures in the 1994 Civil War it once feared: 
the former Marxist-Leninists of South Yemen.4
The post-Arab Spring phase saw the Saudi-led 
Gulf Cooperation Council persuade the Yemeni 
elite to implement an initiative that saw Saleh step 
down and be replaced by his deputy, Abd-Rabbo 
Mansour Hadi. Saleh was given immunity from 
prosecution, as well as being allowed to continue 
in politics, in return for his resignation. However, 
the emergence of Qatar, and Saudi reticence to 
support Muslim Brotherhood movements, meant 
the sidelining of one of Saudi Arabia’s most 
powerful allies in Yemen, the Islah Party.
The al-Ahmar family, the leaders of Hashid, 
Yemen’s most powerful tribal confederation, 
featured prominently amongst the upper tier of 
Islah’s leadership, and were also very close to Saudi 
Arabia. In the years after Yemen’s unification in 
1990, Islah played very much the role of the ‘loyal 
opposition’ in an alliance with Saleh against a 
common enemy, the Socialist Party. Islah’s role, 
and especially that of its tribal wing, as a useful 
ally to Saudi Arabia was at odds with Riyadh’s 
post-2011 regional crackdown on the Muslim 
Brotherhood, which it saw as a regional threat 
in the light of their gains in post-revolutionary 
Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen. 
The failure of the GCC initiative to steer Yemen’s 
democratic transition, and the weakening of Islah, 
eventually led to the Houthi-Saleh overthrow 
of the government in Sanaa, the final touches to 
which were made in February 2015, and the launch 
of what was initially called ‘Operation Decisive 
4 Ibid., p. 77
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Storm’, a military coalition dominated by Saudi 
Arabia carrying out an unprecedented airstrike 
campaign in an attempt to eliminate the Houthis.
Saudi Arabia’s on-off relationship with Islah is 
now especially evident as the war carries on. The 
party is the most popular anti-Houthi force on 
the ground in Yemen and therefore particularly 
useful in the campaign. However, the Kingdom, 
and its ally the United Arab Emirates, is also wary 
of allowing Islah, and by extension the Muslim 
Brotherhood, to strengthen its position in the event 
of the Houthis and Saleh falling. This is something 
that could possibly explain the complaints of anti-
Houthi fighters in Yemen’s central city of Taiz, 
many of whom are associated with Islah, that they 
have been receiving relatively little support from 
the Saudi-led coalition in comparison with the 
southern city of Aden, where most local fighters 
are southern separatists. 
FEAR OF EGYPT
Dominance in Yemen by a non-friendly state 
would pose a severe security threat to Saudi Arabia. 
The best historical example of this comes from the 
1960s. At that time Saudi Arabia felt particularly 
vulnerable and so the threat that came from a 
large Egyptian presence in North Yemen was felt 
particularly. During the North Yemeni Civil War, 
the primary goal of the Saudis was not actually the 
return of the Imamate monarchy but the removal 
of the Egyptians from North Yemen. This was 
demonstrated by Saudi Arabia’s agreement to a 
UN plan that would have seen it stop supporting 
the royalists in return for Egyptian withdrawal 
from North Yemen.5
For Nasser, a foothold in the Arabian Peninsula 
on the doorstep of his greatest foe, Saudi Arabia, 
was too tempting to pass up. King Saud and (then) 
Crown Prince Faisal were more than aware of this 
5 G. Gause, Saudi-Yemeni Relations, New York: Colum-
bia University Press, 2010, p. 63.
and saw Nasser’s dispatch of troops to North Yemen 
as a move to “overthrow the Saudi monarchy 
and gain control of the vast oil resources which 
it possessed”.6 The Egyptian presence in North 
Yemen meant that Nasser now had a base from 
which he could conduct operations against Saudi 
Arabia. Saboteurs started to infiltrate the Saudi 
territory from “revolutionary Yemen”.7 In 1967, 
for example, seventeen Yemenis were publicly 
beheaded in Riyadh after being found guilty of 
planning bomb explosions.8
The Saudi Arabians aimed to make the situation 
for the Egyptians in North Yemen untenable. 
At the same time, and especially during the 
later years of the civil war, the Saudis began 
more covert moves to back a ‘third party’ in the 
conflict. Omar Saqqaf, the Saudi Vice-Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, explained to the British in 1964 
that the “Saudis hoped that as matters dragged 
on, Yemenis on both sides would eventually get 
together; there were moderate republicans who 
disliked the republic and there were royalists who 
disliked the Imam”.9 The Saudis, therefore, were 
trying to find suitably friendly forces in North 
Yemen who would not threaten Saudi security 
should they take over. In fact, the Saudi attempts 
to woo republicans away from Nasser’s Egypt were 
relatively successful. As early as 1965, leading 
figures in the revolution against the Imam, such as 
Ahmed Nu’man, future President Abdulrahman 
al-Iryani, and Muhammed al-Zubayri, took 
part in the Khamir Conference, where Nu’man 
announced that he was prepared to extend “the 
6 G. A Fawaz, “The Kennedy Administration and the 
Egyptian-Saudi Conflict in Yemen: Co-opting Arab 
Nationalism,” Middle East Journal, 49 no. 2 (1995), p. 
299
7 M. S. Badeeb, The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict Over North 
Yemen, 1962-1970, The George Washington University 
[PhD Dissertation], 1985, p. 112
8 E. O’Ballance, The War in Yemen, Faber & Faber, p. 172
9 Jones, Clive, Britain and the Yemen Civil War 1962-
1965, Sussex Academic Press, 2004, p. 103
The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challenges49
hand of friendship” to Saudi Arabia.10 By 1969, the 
republicans had split along ideological lines and 
the conservatives, who had defeated the leftists in 
a power struggle, began to court the Saudis.
FEAR OF A STRONG YEMEN
One of Saudi Arabia’s many balancing acts in 
Yemen has been to ensure that it does not get too 
strong but at the same time does not collapse. 
The idea is that Yemen’s problems should stay 
contained within Yemen and not trouble Saudi 
Arabia. To this end, Saudi Arabia has worked 
to prop up the Yemeni government, most often 
with financial aid, especially after 2011. With the 
government facing bankruptcy numerous times in 
these past few years, the Saudis have stepped in, 
often quietly, to ensure that government employees 
were paid and fuel flowed into the country. This, 
however, stopped when the Houthis took over 
Sanaa. Nevertheless, it can be argued that even 
its military intervention in Yemen is designed to 
aid the legitimate Yemeni government, even if the 
actual results of the intervention seem to have 
made things worse.
The intervention can also be looked at in another 
light: as an attempt by Saudi Arabia to crush 
any possibility that Yemen could becoming 
independent of its sphere of influence, and, even 
worse, join the Iranian orbit. This fear of being 
unable to control Yemen has driven Saudi Arabia 
into action in the past. In November 1990, a mere 
few months after North and South Yemen united 
to form the Republic of Yemen, a state that could 
potentially threaten Saudi Arabia’s dominant 
position in the region in the future, the Yemenis 
found themselves on the United Nations Security 
Council voting on whether to condemn Saddam 
Hussein’s invasion of Iraq and request his troops to 
withdraw, thereby setting in motion the First Gulf 
War. For various reasons, including Saleh’s affinity 
10 O’Ballance, op. cit., p. 167
to Saddam, Yemen abstained and called for an 
Arab solution to the crisis, attempting to maintain 
an official policy of neutrality. The Gulf states, led 
by Saudi Arabia, responded with fury. Yemenis in 
Saudi Arabia, who had previously been exempt 
from being treated as foreign nationals when it 
came to employment there, were given thirty 
days to find a Saudi sponsor. This was effectively 
impossible, and in just over a month one million 
Yemeni foreign workers in Saudi Arabia returned 
destitute to Yemen.11 The results were devastating 
for the Yemeni economy: the inflation rate reached 
100 percent and GDP dropped 4.8 percent by 1991, 
and unemployment went to 35 percent in 1992. 
This was coupled with aid from the Gulf states 
decreasing from $20.5 million to $2.9 million.12
The Saudi Arabians have also worked to weaken 
the Yemeni state in a different way – by keeping 
non-state actors, mostly Yemen’s famous tribes, 
well paid. It is often argued that the tribal system 
is an inherent part of Yemen, with the most 
important, the Hashid and Bakil, believed to 
date back to the pre-Islamic period. There is an 
old Yemeni tribal saying that Yemen is the tribes 
and the tribes are Yemen.13 Nevertheless, some 
Yemeni leaders have been able to move against the 
tribes. In South Yemen, the Marxists were able to 
effectively eradicate their power, and even in North 
Yemen President Ibrahim al-Hamdi successfully 
weakened them in the 1970s,14although he was 
eventually killed for his troubles.15
11 P. Conge and G. Okruhlik, “National Autonomy, Labor 
Migration and Political Crisis: Yemen and Saudi Ara-
bia,” Middle East Journal, 51 no. 4, 1995, p. 560
12 Ibid.
13 P. Dresch,op. cit., p. 47 
14 A. A. Al-Ahsab, “What Makes Yemen’s Spring Differ-
ent?” in The Arab Spring and Arab Thaw: Unfinished 
Revolutions and the Quest for Democracy, edited by 
John Davis, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd, 2013.
15 E. M. Manea, “La tribu et l’Etat au Yemen” in Islam et 
changement social, edited by Mondher Kilani, Laus-
anne: Editions Payot, 1998, pp. 205-218
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HAS SAUDI ARABIA BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN 
ITS INTERVENTIONS?
We can now come to look at whether Saudi Arabia 
has been successful in its interventions in Yemen, 
and I shall start with Saudi Arabia’s dealings with 
its allies within Yemen.
In his book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 
the political scientist John Mearsheimer states 
that “alliances are only temporary marriages of 
convenience: today’s alliance partner might be 
tomorrow’s enemy, and today’s enemy might be 
tomorrow’s alliance partner”.16 This is indeed true 
when it comes to Saudi Arabia’s allies in Yemen, 
be they Ali Abdullah Saleh or Yemen’s numerous 
tribes. 
The problem that has come with Saudi Arabian 
largesse in Yemen is that its allies have not been 
particularly reliable. Especially by the tribes, Saudi 
Arabia has been seen as a bank. The tribes would 
always agree to take the money, but that was no 
guarantee that they would fight on behalf of Saudi 
Arabia.17 Currently, despite years of lavishing funds 
on influential tribal sheikhs, Saudi Arabia finds 
itself in a position where most of the important 
northern sheikhs have thrown in their lot with 
Saleh and the Houthis, and where those who have 
not have proven themselves to be ineffective and 
weak.
Part of this was out of Saudi Arabia’s hands. 
Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar, the paramount leader 
of Hashid, was Saudi Arabia’s man in Yemen. 
It was he who brought Saleh into the Saudi fold 
at the start of his presidency18 and ensured that 
Yemen’s ‘multi-party democracy’ did not get too 
16 J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W. 
W. Norton & Company, 2001, p.33 
17 M.Kamrava, The Modern Middle East: A Political His-
tory Since the First World War,  University of California 
Press, 2011, p. 115
18 B. Al-Baker, “Power and War in Saudi Arabia’s Back-
yard,” Al-Araby Al-Jadeed English, 10 February 2015, 
http://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2015/2/11/
power-and-war-in-saudi-arabias-backyard 
lively, with the Islah Party that he led serving, in 
effect, as a loyal opposition party to Saleh until the 
early 2000s. He was able to keep things relatively 
calm in Yemen, but his death in 2007 marked the 
beginning of the end of the great balancing act 
within Yemen, the loss of an extremely valuable 
ally for Saudi Arabia, and left shoes that his many 
sons simply could not fill. 
Instead, slowly but surely, Yemen has descended 
into anarchy. The Houthis, from their heartland of 
Sa’dah right up on the Saudi Arabian border, fought 
six wars against the Yemeni state from 2004 to 2010, 
none of which ended decisively and one of which 
involved a poor performance by Saudi Arabia 
and a brief foray by the Houthis over the border.19 
2011 brought revolution, and the unknown. In the 
short term, Saudi Arabia managed to influence 
a political transition whereby its allies could still 
hold sway south of the border, but the problematic 
nature of the ‘democratic transition’ and its failure 
to address the root causes of the 2011 protest 
movement were there for all to see. 
A free-falling Yemeni economy, the inability of 
Hadi to enforce his will, the lawless nature of many 
parts of the country, a burgeoning but disunited 
southern secessionist movement, and al-Qaeda 
roaming areas of the country freely all gave the 
impression of a failing state. These problems have 
largely stayed within Yemen’s borders for now, but 
the potential for them to spill over the border is 
great.
Saudi Arabia’s military intervention has so far not 
achieved its stated goal of removing the Houthis. 
The Houthis and Saleh have been pushed back in 
the south of the country, but still do not appear to 
be on the verge of defeat. Local ‘resistance’ forces 
on the ground – who often represent no one 
but themselves despite the international media 
seemingly insisting that they are fighting for Hadi 
– are spirited but lack coordination, training and 
19 T. Y Ismael and J. Ismael, Government and Politics of 
the Contemporary Middle East: Continuity and Change, 
Routledge, 2012, p. 410
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tactics, and are finding the going difficult. More 
importantly, and highlighting Yemen’s lack of 
national unity, they are not willing to fight in areas 
of the country away from their own. This was seen 
in the outright refusal of southern fighters to fight 
in the north of Yemen. 
Worse still, the Houthi-Saleh forces have begun 
to fire missiles across the border and also even to 
make brief forays attacking Saudi Arabian border 
posts – an embarrassment for Saudi Arabia.20 
Saudi Arabia has now bogged itself down in a 
ground invasion, and along with its Gulf allies has 
taken losses. The advance towards Sana’a is slow, 
has cost billions of dollars in a period of tightened 
Saudi purse strings, and may face more criticism at 
home should the numbers of Saudi dead continue 
to rise. 
CONCLUSION: LESSONS TO BE LEARNED
First and foremost, it is important to remember 
that Yemen is a unique country in the region, 
enjoying its own history, culture and political 
landscape. Therefore, any attempts to extrapolate 
from the Saudi Arabian experience in Yemen 
and project it onto other countries in the region 
will be fruitless. However, many lessons can still 
be learned from Saudi Arabia’s interventions in 
Yemen. 
Despite often being perceived, especially in 
journalistic circles, as a state driven by a religious 
ideology and one that can perhaps act irrationally 
in the political sense, it is quite clear that in 
actuality Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy is by and 
large motivated by security concerns, specifically 
the security of the ruling al-Saud family. In this 
regard, Saudi Arabia is much like most other states 
in the world.
As explained above, the Saudi Arabians have 
often allied with forces that they either previously 
20 BBC News, “Yemen Crisis: Saudi Arabia ‘repels Houthi 
border attack’,” 1 May 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-middle-east-32537543
opposed or that seem ideologically opposed to 
them. The Saudi Arabian aim has not been to 
completely dominate Yemen and annex it, but 
merely to ensure that it does not pose a threat to 
Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia’s focus is on just one 
thing when handling its neighbour: security.
A question that is glaringly obvious in the light 
of the current conflict in Yemen is how reliable 
local proxies can be. These proxies have failed 
Saudi Arabia, and some, such as Saleh, are 
actively attacking it. Billions of dollars have been 
channelled to actors across the border and yet 
Saudi Arabia still finds itself with a pro-Iranian 
group on the verge of taking over Yemen and al-
Qaeda growing in strength. What level of influence 
can a country project through unreliable local 
allies? Local proxies allow a state like Saudi Arabia 
to avoid getting its hands dirty, but when they fail 
what comes next?
Can a military intervention by a Gulf state succeed? 
Despite much talk of a new age of Gulf military 
unilateralism, the fighting performance of Saudi 
Arabia and its allies has been poor. Saudi Arabia 
and its fellow Gulf states certainly have modern 
air forces, but clearly air power is not sufficient. 
Will Saudi Arabia, and by extension other Gulf 
states, continue to risk their own troops in the 
regions’ conflict zones, as they have in Yemen? Or 
will they continue to risk dealing with unreliable 
and potentially unsavoury characters to do the job 
for them? 
For Saudi Arabia, a clear lesson is that the policy 
of attempting to prevent the Yemeni state from 
growing stronger and its irrational fear that a 
Yemen with a more independent domestic and 
foreign policy could be dangerous have led to 
disaster. The Saudi Arabians should help build the 
Yemeni state and its institutions and allow this 
rapidly-growing country to achieve its potential. 
Yemen’s young and hard-working population 
would be a boon to the Gulf economies should 
restrictions on work visas be relaxed. Yemen and 
Saudi Arabia can exist as peaceful neighbours, and 
must, if the two countries are to prosper.
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INTRODUCTION
Al Qaeda (AQ) remains an organization with an 
Arab-Islamic identity, built around a political 
core to which are attached official wings bound by 
varying degrees of proximity. AQ has also taken 
the form of an ideological movement, which is the 
origin of the geographical extension of its ideas. 
This expansion has evolved in the wake of the Arab 
revolts, which, by opening political fields and ideas 
have offered opportunities for many jihadists from 
AQ movements to present themselves as social 
forces (in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt under the name 
of Ansar al-Sharia). However, in 2013 the policy 
changes of authorities in transition (Tunisia, Libya) 
and the return of authoritarian regimes (Egypt) 
limited the scope of action of these movements. 
 
The most influential AQ supporters are currently 
mainly located in Yemen – the hub of the 
organization Al-Qaeda in the Arabic Peninsula 
(AQAP), and in Syria – with the strategic 
bridgehead for the jihadist agenda in the Levant 
under the umbrella of many groups like Jabhat 
al-Nusra (JaN). In spring 2013, this region saw 
the dissent of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS), leading to further competition among the 
jihadist organizations of the two camps. Since 
the beginning of 2014, ISIS, renamed on 29 June 
Islamic State (IS), proclaimed a Caliphate and 
carried out a major territorial conquest in Iraq (its 
original birthplace) and Syria. Its local alliances 
have enabled it to make substantial military gains, 
particularly with the takeover of major Sunni cities 
in Iraq, such as Mossoul, Falouja and Ramadi. 
ISIS then became a form of disparate coalition 
(formed of Iraqi jihadists and insurgents: ISIS 
Iraqi militants, tribal leaders opposed to the Shia 
regime in Baghdad, some local jihadist factions, 
foreign fighters and former military Baathists). In 
search of new alliances with other jihadist groups, 
the main ambition of ISIS and its leader, Abu Bakr 
al-Baghdadi, is to become the new icon for the 
defence of Sunni Arabs through an expansionist 
strategy with an operative communication plan.
The rise of radical jihadist organizations such as 
ISIS and AQAP has largely forced the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia (KSA) to implement a policy 
against these armed jihadist groups. Aware of the 
new threat represented by ISIS, KSA decided to 
participate in the international coalition led by the 
United States in September 2014 with Jordan and 
three other countries from the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (Qatar, UAE and Bahrain). In Yemen, the 
political crisis after Houthi rebels took Sanaa led 
to the establishment of a Sunni military coalition 
against the Houthi militias. As with the Peninsula 
Shield operation in Bahrain in March 2011, the 
Decisive Storm operation should be interpreted 
as demonstration of the willingness of the Saudis 
to stop any Iranian proxy threat in its immediate 
regional framework. Since their involvement in 
the coalition against ISIS, the Saudis now consider 
the fight against jihadism a second priority. The 
recent Decisive Storm intervention also has the 
further objective of regaining the support of the 
tribes and preventing them from shifting toward 
radical Sunni groups like AQAP or ISIS. These 
commitments also have important consequences 
for KSA domestic stability because the kingdom 
fears the potential effects of ISIS since attacks 
targeted several Shia mosques on its own territory.
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1 - AL-QAEDA: A WEAKENED CENTRAL 
CORE WITH MORE INDEPENDENT 
WINGS    
Since 2011, besides the death of its historic leader, 
Osama bin Laden, the core of AQ has lost most 
of its influential lieutenants. Most were killed by 
US drone strikes in Pakistan’s tribal areas.1 This 
had significant consequences and weakened AQ’s 
central command, which is currently unable 
to set up a high-level operational strategy. This 
situation has forced AQ to review its strategy 
and to adopt new approaches on the ground. The 
several partnerships observed among the jihadists 
in Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen and in the Sahel area 
are perfect illustrations of this reawakening. The 
strategy shows an adaptation to local specificities 
by making alliances with local armed militias 
organized through tribal, regional and also ethnic 
and religious ties.
1.1 How AQ became a network of proxies
AQAP has been working in Yemen to establish a 
more solid haven since 2009. After initiating an 
expensive regionalization phase in the southern 
governorates of Abyan and Shabwa in 2011, 
resulting from the fall of President Saleh, AQAP 
changed its strategy. After 2013, its members 
strengthened their efforts and carried out major 
actions against the Yemeni Armed Forces (attacks 
against official military buildings, security force 
officers and Western expatriates). AQ faced an 
absence of leadership succession in its central core 
based in the Afghanistan and Pakistan regions 
and so Yemen, with the increased presence of 
AQAP, has become the new ideological and 
operational centre of gravity for the AQ central 
command. Following the Huthi rebels taking 
1 The main lieutenants of Osama bin Laden killed by US 
drones are the Egyptian Mustafa Abu al-Yazid in March 
2010, the Libyans Jamal Ibrahim al-Misrati (aka Atiyah 
Allah al-Libi) in August 2011 and Hassan Muhammad 
Qaed (aka Abu Yahya al-Libi) in June 2012. 
Sanaa in September 2014, the country slipped 
into a civil war in March 2015 involving a Sunni 
Arab military intervention under Saudi Arabian 
leadership. AQAP has fully benefited from this 
instability to strengthen its presence, particularly 
in the southern governorates of Hadramawt and 
Shabwa because the Arab coalition does not 
consider the war against AQAP a current priority, 
but only secondary. However, Riyadh indeed fears 
a shift in the Yemeni Sunni tribes in favour of 
jihadist groups (AQAP and ISIS, which has also 
claimed wilayas in Yemen since January 2015). 
In this contradiction, the Kingdom needs the 
indirect support of AQAP, which represents the 
best bulwark in South Yemen to contain the Huthi 
progression. KSA also supports the legitimate 
government of President Hadi, who sees the AQAP 
threat as important as the Huthi rebels. Defining 
who is the most dangerous enemy in Yemen could 
thus be the next policy priority for KSA.   
In North Africa, Al Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM) has gained prominence since 
its creation in 2007. The organization achieved 
this development on several fronts: first, it took 
advantage of the context of Arab revolts in the 
region to extend its influence; and second, it 
continued the expansion of its activities in the 
Sahel area. AQIM transferred its main forces to 
the south, which changed its centre of gravity from 
the North Algerian Mountains to the Sahelian 
zone, while preserving its Algerian leadership. 
The movement wanted to become the African 
jihadist showcase. However, the French military 
operation in early 2013 (aka Serval) led to a new 
period of dispersion and local reconfigurations. 
AQIM has been weakened in Sahel and lost its 
main operative Katiba leaders, but the group has 
continued to search for new alliances in order to 
preserve its activities in this region. It is trying to 
reposition its activities in North Africa, mostly in 
Tunisia and Libya. In the Sahel, the strengthening 
of links with Tuareg radicals allows it to maintain 
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a disseminated presence in northern Mali. AQIM 
has also suffered several internal difficulties, which 
weakened its leadership in 2011 with the creation 
of the Unicity Movement in West Africa (also 
known under the French acronym MUJAO) and 
in September 2012 with a rupture with Mokhtar 
Bel-Mokhtar, who led one of AQIM’s Katiba in the 
Sahel.2  
In Syria, the strong militarization of protest 
against Assad’s regime and the lack of a political 
solution has greatly promoted the emancipation of 
jihadist groups, which have become increasingly 
active and effective. A continual flow of foreign 
fighters, currently estimated at around 25,000 
activists, has reinforced this phenomenon. For 
AQ, Syria has become the stepping stone for an 
offensive strategy in the Levant. Since the JaN 
pledged allegiance to AQ in April 2013, this group 
has emerged as the front for AQ in Syria. Other 
jihadist structures, such as Jund al-Aqsa Junud al-
Sham, a coalition of the Ansareddin Front and the 
Ahrar al-Sham movement, have gained support 
from AQ militants who joined in Syria. The 
current situation in Syria features jihadist rivalries 
between AQ’s supporters. On the one side are 
those who do not reject alliances and coalitions 
with other Syrian Islamist factions; on the other 
are those who exclusively follow the line endorsed 
by ISIS, which controls an unbroken swathe of 
territory from eastern Syria to western Iraq. This 
has led to deep divisions within the Syrian jihadist 
groups.
The conflict publicly observed in Syria is 
characteristic of recurrent divisions seen within 
the Global jihadist movement in the last decade. 
In fact, there are many historical precedents, from 
Afghanistan to North Africa and in the Arabian 
Peninsula and Iraq. These regions have all been 
exposed to ideological fractures, which have 
2 In August 2013, the main faction of the MUJAO merged 
with the Belmokhtar group to become the al-Mourabi-
toun organization, which has so far maintained its alle-
giance with AQ. 
sometimes strengthened power struggles within 
the movement. After the split between JaN and 
ISIS, the role and authority of Ayman Al-Zhawahiri 
at the top of AQ were clearly challenged. Every 
jihadist body is now forced to align itself with or 
against one camp, i.e. JaN, the AQ proxy in Syria, 
or ISIS.
1.2 Syria also became a new Jihadist haven for 
Saudis fighters
From the beginning of the militarization of the 
Syrian opposition phase during the summer of 
2011, probably galvanized by the many calls from 
Saudi territory to overthrow the Syrian regime 
observed since the beginning of 2012, Saudis 
jihadists have played an influential role in the 
Levant within some radical groups like ISIS and 
JaN. The proportion of Saudi fighters in Syria 
appears to have considerably risen since the 
summer of 2012. Currently estimated between 
2500 and 3000 combatants, they are, with the 
Tunisians and Jordanians, the largest group of 
foreign fighters. As noticed in previous experiences 
during the Jihad campaigns in Afghanistan, 
Chechnya, Iraq and Yemen, their motives are 
mainly based on a political-religious commitment: 
to fight the tyranny of the Syrian regime, to defend 
Sunni populations, to fight the Alawi sect, which is 
considered heretical, and to fight against Iranian, 
Iraqi and Lebanese Shia militias. In Syria, the Saudi 
jihadists have formed small, often independent, 
groups (such as the al-Khadra and al-’Izz Suqur 
Brigades), and then gradually rallied to dominant 
movements like JaN and ISIS (almost 60% of them 
are currently estimated to be fighting in the ranks 
of ISIS in Syria and Iraq). This influence of ISIS 
inside the Saudi jihadist framework should also 
been understood as resulting from the influence 
of many Saudi jihadist networks formed for the 
recruitment of more than 3,000 fighters in Iraq 
between 2003 and 2008.
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1.3 Ansar al-Sharia: the origin and structure of a 
new jihadist movement
In the Arab countries that experienced regime 
change after the wave of popular protest (Egypt, 
Tunisia and Libya), some jihadist militant 
groups released from prison or returning after 
years of exile have turned into social preaching 
movements. Unlike other Islamist forces which 
have entered a phase of institutionalization, like 
the Muslim Brotherhood and some Salafist parties 
in Egypt and Yemen, they prefer to remain outside 
of politics. While the narratives of these jihadists 
are global, displaying solidarity with oppressed 
Muslims around the world, their strategy is, 
however, based on local actions that take into 
consideration the immediate needs of the poorest 
part of the population. These movements have 
become extremely popular, even among pious 
educated youths who sometimes have a higher 
level of education but are still economically 
marginalized. Furthermore, failures of states – 
and the subsequent frustration that emerges – 
strengthen the popularity of these movements. 
They define themselves with a dual identity (both 
Salafist and jihadist) and most of them have 
adopted the name Ansar al-Sharia (AS, supporters 
of Sharia).
In the context of popular protest against the 
Yemeni regime in May 2011, the tribal jihadist 
insurgency in Yemen, which initiated in the 
southern provinces of Abyan and Shabwa, was 
based on an organization named AS in Yemen. The 
composition of this structure, which had a highly 
decentralized leadership, remained extremely 
heterogeneous. Islamists from the former Aden 
Abyan Army (an armed jihadist movement based 
in Southern Yemen and active between 1998 
and 2002) recommitted themselves around an 
irredentist core. Other activists from the southern 
secessionist movement passed into a new Islamist 
resistance and local tribesmen were radicalized 
after US drone attacks in December 2009.3 The 
activists of the AQAP cells also decided to merge 
into an insurgent group with a significant tribal 
identity.
The establishment of AS in Yemen not only marks 
a will to give an Islamic colour to political demands 
based on a rejection of the patrimonial state 
implemented by President Ali Saleh; it also allows 
for the foundation of an opposition to a central 
authority perceived as authoritarian and devoid 
of social justice. However, in these provinces, the 
distinction between AS and AQAP remains only 
symbolic and is confined to the communication 
level. The two groups communicate differently, 
using different networks on the Web, but they are 
coordinated at the command level. The leaders of 
AS have local power but do not speak for AQAP, 
which is more active in global Jihad issues. AS in 
Yemen is primarily a shop window that allows 
AQAP to benefit from a popular and necessary 
base for its organization, which has adapted to its 
tribal, social and political milieu.4
In Tunisia, the AS group was formed in May 
2011 and became the main jihadist representative 
movement in the country. It opened talks with the 
Ennahda Islamist movement and took advantage 
of the space for expression offered to propagate 
its discourse by controlling local prayer rooms 
and mosques. Efficient dissemination of this 
preaching and a strong presence in social media 
networks like Facebook and Twitter help AS to 
control several social networks in the country. 
Charity associations accompanied this policy on 
the ground and there were violent demonstrations 
3 The cases of the Awaliq tribe in Abyan and the Shabwa 
and Al Dhahab family clans in al-Baydha province 
are representative of the patterns of radicalization in 
Yemeni tribes. 
4 In April 2015, after the fall of the city of Mukalla in 
Hadramawt following the collapse of the Yemeni 
government, AQAP and Ansar al-Sharia supporters 
appeared under a new alias called “the Sons of Hadra-
mawt”. The aim is to give local colour to the jihadist 
movement and to obtain more people support. 
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to defend their conception  of Islam. AS in Tunisia 
was then dismantled after the group was banned 
by the authorities in the summer of 2013. This was 
due to murders of political figures in 2013 and 
violent confrontations in the Shaambi Mountains 
between security forces and armed activists. Many 
AS militants were arrested and the movement 
became totally illegal and lost its principal bases 
in the country. Its ability to communicate was 
drastically reduced and it was confronted with the 
exile of its main leaders, such as its founder Ben 
Hassine Sayfallah (aka Abu Ayyadh al-Tunisi). 
Tunisian fighters from Syria (estimated at more 
than 3000) and Libya, mostly affiliated to ISIS, 
gradually became the principal nodes of the 
main Tunisian jihadist communication networks 
by relaying information from the key figures in 
AS. After this period, the option of violence has 
therefore seemed on the rise within the AS ranks. 
The presence of training facilities in Libya could 
lead some Tunisian jihadist networks to carry out 
attacks from there against the Tunisian authorities 
(targeting security forces, prisons, politicians, 
tourism facilities and ex-patriots).
Starting from June 2012, the same AS group 
appeared in northwest Libya (mainly in Derna 
and Benghazi). Similar methods to those seen in 
Tunisia were applied, but AS in Libya is also linked 
with armed militias whose existence remains a 
structural element of the Libyan landscape after 
the fall of Muammar Gaddafi. After this event, 
the weakness of the new transitional political 
institutions, a lack of a united security apparatus 
and the militarization of political competition 
with the offensive by General Haftar, launched in 
2014 and supported by several authoritarian Arab 
regimes, strengthened and expanded the presence 
of jihadist groups in Libya. This context caused 
further radicalization and anti-government 
rhetoric within the Libyan jihadist structures. 
AS also received verbal support from some 
representatives of AQ. The group in Libya has 
confirmed its participation in the various clashes 
which took place against the Haftar coalition. The 
phase of being a simple preaching association 
seems to have ended because of the confrontation 
imposed by the Haftar camp. AS in Libya has also 
rejected the positions of the Fajr Libya militias, 
another coalition based in Tripoli and Misrata. 
Since the summer of 2014 it has joined other 
Islamist coalitions based in Benghazi and Derna 
against the Tobruk authorities.
In Egypt, the release of many figures who were 
arrested during the Afghan jihad period resulted 
in the creation of a militant group. Its action is 
focused outside the political framework and it also 
took the name of AS. This group soon expressed its 
opposition to the political programme presented 
by the Salafist parties (such as Al-Nour), which 
it considered too modernist because of their 
recognition of the democratic political system. 
The Egyptian jihadists have also tried to extend 
their influence by organizing several media 
actions in solidarity with their “AS brothers” 
in Tunisia and Libya, and by carrying out joint 
projects with some Salafist centres based in Gaza. 
They have taken advantage of their charismatic 
leaders, such as Ahmad Ashwash and Muhamad 
al-Zhawahiri, the brother of the current AQ 
Emir. However, the repression that followed the 
removal of President Muhamad Morsi in 3 July 
2013 changed the Islamist balance in the Egyptian 
scene. The jihadists, who refused en masse to 
show up alongside the pro-Morsi demonstrators 
to defend the democratic legitimacy of the former 
president, have not been spared from repression. 
Many of their influential figures, including Al-
Zhawahiri, have been arrested. Many activists 
from the period between 2011 and 2013 who 
escaped repression have joined armed jihadist 
groups mainly active in the north and in the Sinai 
Peninsula, such as Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, formed 
in 2011 by militants from Sinai.
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2 - THE RISE OF ISIS
2.1 A movement deeply rooted in Iraq
The history of ISIS is characterized by attempts 
at unification of the many armed Sunni Islamist 
brigades which gradually emerged after the US 
military intervention in 2003. This process went 
through many phases. From AQ in Mesopotamia 
under the leadership of Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi, 
the group changed its name three times to 
become “Islamic state in Iraq” (ISI) in January 
2007. This transformation was the result of the 
ISI leadership, which had been dominated by 
Iraqis since the death of Zarqawi, preferring to 
emancipate themselves from the tutelage of AQ 
and to promote a programme of establishing an 
Islamic state in Iraq.
The organization was weakened by a multi-faceted 
security policy and pushed from the heart of 
Baghdad in 2009, and it seemed to have difficulty 
finding a second breath. In fact, after 2010 ISI 
only made its presence felt on Iraqi territory by 
means of specific localized spectacular actions 
(explosions, mainly targeting security sites, 
conscription centres, members of resilient Sunni 
militias and Shia religious places). The deaths of 
the two main figures in the movement in April 
20105 and multiple arrests of its members by the 
Iraqi security forces had substantial consequences 
for the efficiency of the group, which in 2011was 
considered to be very weak.
5 Its emir, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, a former officer in the 
Baathist army, and the Egyptian Abu Ayyub, the true 
religious eminence of the movement, were killed in a US 
air strike, as Al-Zarqawi had been in June 2006. 
2.2 The positive momentum of the Arab revolts
However, with a rise of deep Sunni frustration 
resulting in protests increasingly turned against 
the central Iraqi government ruled by PM Nuri al-
Maliki, the domestic Iraqi context gradually became 
favourable to ISI. The Sunni Arabs perceived 
the authorities to be discriminating against their 
community. In spring 2013, ISI changed its name 
again and became the “Islamic State in Iraq and 
the Levant” (ISIS), due to its presence in the Syrian 
conflict. The movement was also strengthened 
with a new leadership and by the hegemonic 
ambitions of its new emir, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. 
A rise in Sunni-Shia rivalries in Iraq, combined 
with the development of the Syrian conflict with 
a massive influx of foreign fighters, considerably 
strengthened the movement. Moreover, taking 
advantage of the exasperation of some Sunni 
tribal leaders with the Maliki government, ISIS 
was able to amplify its recruitment base. Former 
minor Iraqi jihadist groups such as Ansar al-Islam 
(composed of Islamist Kurds), Ansar al-Sunna and 
Jaysh al-Islami also joined the ISIS cause to carry 
out anti-government attacks, without claiming 
allegiance to al-Baghdadi.
After the beginning of 2014, ISIS launched a major 
offensive for territorial conquest. Its local alliances 
have enabled it to obtain substantial military 
gains by taking control of major Sunni cities, like 
Mosul. The ISIS strategy in Syria is influenced by 
the Iraq war, in which Sunni antagonism against 
the Alawi-Shia alliance was greatly exploited. 
While some clans have rallied to ISIS as an anti-
Maliki option, without sharing the ideals of this 
ultra-radical jihadist organization, ISIS continues 
to maintain a strong territorial base the size of the 
UK between Syria and Iraq.
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2.3 The Caliphate as an expansionist agenda
On 29 June 2014, ISIS announced the restoration 
of the Islamic Caliphate in Syria and Iraq, ruled 
by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. As well as being part 
of a well-organized communication strategy, this 
announcement marked the determination of ISIS 
to set itself up as a regional jihadist movement. 
It also underlined the importance of Iraq in the 
history of the Caliphate to gain Islamic support for 
its legitimacy. Since this announcement, despite 
many groups and activists claiming allegiance to its 
command, ISIS has remained extremely localized.6 
Its expansion is geographically extensive but it 
includes a limited number of militants. However, 
it has gained from a leadership crisis in the AQ 
ranks as a consequence of several leaders being 
killed in drone strikes (in Yemen7 and Waziristan). 
Divisions between rival AQIM and AS factions in 
North Africa have contributed to strengthening 
its position. More specifically, allegiances with 
Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis in Sinai (November 2014), 
small armed groups in Libya (October 2014) and 
Boko Haram in Nigeria (March 2015) remain the 
most significant successes of the organization. 
Furthermore, its networks in Saudi Arabia have 
also been growing since attacks were carried out 
against Shia religious sites in November 2014 
and May 2015. In Yemen, the failure of the state 
promoted chaos and saw the emergence of small 
ISIS cells in March 2014. However, even though 
these factions have targeted Hawthi rebels and 
Shia Zaydi centres in Sanaa, they are not able to 
contest AQAP hegemony. The organization also 
tries to claim responsibility for all individual 
jihadist operations in the world thanks to a very 
effective propaganda apparatus involving several 
communication networks on the web.
6 Splits with a region of AQIM, with some Pakistani Tal-
iban leaders, some figures in AS in Tunisia, and mili-
tants in the Sahel, Jordan, Indonesia, Philippines and 
the Caucasus can be mentioned. 
7 Since 2015, AQAP has lost most of its leaders in Yemen: 
Hareth al-Nazhari, Ibrahim al-Rubaysh, Ali al-Ansi 
and its Emir Nasser al-Wahishi were all killed by drone 
strikes in the region of Hadramawt.
2.4 The Saudi Arabian territory and the new ISIS 
threat
The military successes of ISIS in Syria and Iraq 
and the proclamation of the caliphate confirmed 
the attractiveness of this organization in radical 
circles inside the Kingdom, especially among 
young people but less among historical Jihadist 
preachers, who still support AQ affiliates. Former 
Saudi fighters in Iraq of the 2003 generation are 
now the current charismatic figures supporting 
networks and cells formed inside KSA.
The domestic Saudi security apparatus (Mabahith) 
announces it has dismantled dozens of operational 
networks linked to ISIS in KSA since May 2014. 
These operations have also included numerous 
arrests in radical spheres. The November 2014 
attack against a hussayniyya (Shia place of 
socialization) in the Eastern Province of Al-Ahsa 
also revealed the presence of pro-ISIS operational 
networks determined to carry out suicide bombing 
attacks on Saudi territory. KSA became a priority 
target for ISIS because of the presence of a Shia 
minority installed in the west of the Kingdom. 
This first attack was a turning point in the modus 
operandi of pro-ISIS jihadists in KSA, whereas 
AQAP never targeted Shia civilians during the 
campaign launched between 2003 and 2006. 
(Three more mosques have been targeted since 
November 2014). The Saudi authorities have also 
decided to reinforce border controls and increase 
surveillance of places of worship to stop any call 
to join Iraq and Syria. The Kingdom fears the 
takeover of border crossings by jihadist fighters in 
the southern Iraqi province of al-Anbar. The reality 
of this threat took a new turn with an incident on 
5 January 2015, when four Jihadists attacked the 
position of Suwayf on the northern border.
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2.5  AQ versus ISIS: Islamic State against the 
State of networks, or the struggle for Jihad
In addition to the military gains achieved in Iraq 
and eastern Syria, which strengthened the influence 
of al-Baghdadi in the conflict for authority against 
AQ,8 the historic global jihadist movement 
continues to benefit from strong support from 
its “local wings” (AQIM and AQAP), and from 
many global jihadist figures. However, the main 
ideologues of these organizations have expressed 
their disagreement with ISIS methods on the 
issues of shedding the blood of Sunni Muslims 
and the need for prior consultation concerning 
the implementation of an Islamic Caliphate and 
the programme for its application.9 Indeed, ISIS 
has been reluctant to share power within the 
jihadist community. Furthermore, its hegemonic 
aspirations related to the Caliphate are regularly 
denounced by AQ. ISIS cannot replace AQ because 
the two groups’ identities are different. ISIS has a 
regional and territorial agenda: the Caliphate; AQ 
is a transnational movement and wants to be the 
inspirational driver of global jihad, turned against 
both Arab regimes and the Western alliance led 
by the United States. As a result, the pro-jihadist 
preachers who speak for AQ from Yemen, Jordan 
and Saudi Arabia continue to maintain the 
estrangement.
These publicly-revealed differences remind us 
of previous recurring divisions within the global 
jihadist movement. The historical conflicts from 
Afghanistan to North Africa – via the Arab 
Peninsula and Iraq – were all characterized by 
ideological fractures, sometimes emphasized by 
power struggles within the movement. The role 
8 After the Syrian discord in spring 2013, AQ announced 
that it would exclusively sponsor JaN, the main jihadist 
rival group of ISIS in Syria. 
9 Since February 2014, the most virulent criticisms 
against ISIS have come from prominent AQ figures, 
such as the Jordanians Abu Qatada and Abu Muham-
mad al-Maqdisi.
and authority of Al-Zhawahiri at the top of AQ has 
clearly been challenged, and every jihadist entity is 
now forced to declare itself for or against one of the 
two camps. Even within jihadist communication, 
the social network groups and forums follow the 
same line. Sometimes these rivalries go beyond 
the ideological framework and escalate into armed 
conflict between pro-AQ and pro-ISIS groups, as 
has happened recently in Syria (since 2014) and in 
Libya in the city of Derna (since June 2015), where 
ISIS supporters have been expelled from the city 
by the local Islamist coalition of which AS in Libya 
is a part.
CONCLUSION
The global jihadist movement has grown 
significantly since the beginning of the Arab 
revolts in 2011. Its expansion has been boosted 
by failed states (Libya, Syria, Yemen), by crises of 
governance and legitimacy (Tunisia, Egypt, Iraq, 
Mali) and by the inability of corrupt authoritarian 
regimes to open their political spheres. The release 
of hundreds of jihadists detained for years in Arab 
prisons has also had an effect in this dynamic.
The jihadist movement is now more regionalized 
and has succeeded in ruling territories and cities 
in the Sahel, Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Libya, places 
where many tribes and people were generally 
opposed to centralizing states. The resources, 
funding and recruitment for these organizations 
have become particularly important. The two 
major labels that have successfully expanded in 
this region are AS and ISIS. The evolution of the 
Syrian conflict and the rise of ISIS in Iraq have led 
to a polarization within the global jihadist field, 
which has become divided between supporters of 
AQ and ISIS. This division is becoming the norm 
and means competition between two jihadist 
poles that are in confrontation for supremacy in 
the global jihad.
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For KSA, the contradictory directions of its 
regional policy constitute a dilemma (whether 
to prioritise fighting Iranian proxies or targeting 
the Jihadist threats). The threat from jihadist 
groups like AQAP, JaN and ISIS forces the Saudi 
authorities to tighten controls on its territory 
with regard to the number of Saudis involved 
in these organizations. However, the Kingdom 
is committed to a policy of participation in two 
main military operations to contain the influence 
of Iran and its proxies in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. 
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of this axis of 
policy will not produce significant results if 
jihadist armed groups are weakened. Ideologically, 
they are the most opposed to the Shia and more 
determined to fight them. These contradictions 
may lead Riyadh to make more difficult choices 
than have been experienced in the Kingdom for 
over a century.
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CONCLUSION. THE GULF 
REGION BEYOND THE ARAB 
SPRING. WHAT IMPLICATIONS 
FOR THE EU?
Luigi Narbone.   
Director of the Mediterranean Programme,  
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 
European University Institute.
The 20th century has witnessed profound chang-
es in the international system and the rise of 
several new countries to the rank of global ac-
tors. The six monarchies of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) are among them. The new status 
of the Gulf has important consequences, particu-
larly for the MENA region, and calls for renewed 
attention from the part of the EU.  
I. THE GULF REGION AND THE WORLD
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, 
Qatar and to a lesser extent Bahrain and 
Oman have long enjoyed world prominence in 
hydrocarbon production and exporting. The GCC 
countries make up around 24 percent of world oil 
production, with over 40 percent and 24 percent 
of world oil and gas reserves respectively. The ten-
year high oil price cycle, which ended in 2014, 
enabled them to enter a period of sustained growth 
and ascend to the status of emerging powers. From 
2009 to 2014, the Gulf countries’ combined GDP 
almost doubled, making them one of the largest 
world economies, while high consumption and 
investment rates increased the integration of the 
region with the rest of the world.  Development 
strategies aimed at reducing dependence on 
oil and gas and at providing employment for 
their growing young populations created major 
investment opportunities in infrastructure, 
services and mega-projects. In a few years, these 
countries transformed their outlook, modernizing 
cities, attracting immigrants from Asia and the 
Middle East, establishing new economic poles and 
turning the Arabian Peninsula into an important 
financial and East-West transport hub. 
At the same time, oil wealth allowed the GCC 
members to intensify their projection onto the 
global stage and to start multiplying international 
links. Diversification strategies put in place by their 
Sovereign Wealth Funds increasingly favoured 
investments in emerging markets. For example, 
Gulf investments in Africa grew considerably, 
particularly in agrobusiness in a quest for food 
security for the region, while energy-hungry 
Asian countries became key trade and investment 
partners. GCC strategic ties with China and India 
deepened substantially, opening the way to co-
operation in numerous areas, including security. 
The EU remained the GCC’s most important 
trading partner. While region-to-region 
ties stagnated because of the stalling of FTA 
negotiations, bilateral economic relations between 
members of the two regional blocks flourished. 
In 2014, the Gulf was the fifth major trading 
partner of the EU, accounting for 4.2 percent of 
total EU trade. Spurred by the need to find new 
markets during the prolonged recession triggered 
by the financial crisis, EU countries invested 
heavily in fostering economic relations with the 
Gulf. European businesses and investors enjoyed 
a dominant role in many sectors, while some 
European countries continued to play a major role 
in GCC security, through security and defence 
cooperation and as arms suppliers. However, the 
deepening of GCC-Asia relations started to pose a 
challenge to the European position.  
The Gulf countries’ pivot to Asia went hand in 
hand with a gradual reduction of the presence 
and influence of the US, the traditional GCC 
partner and security guarantor. The shale energy 
revolution reduced US energy dependency on 
the Middle East and made it possible for the US 
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to start reconsidering its long-standing strategic 
commitment to the region. The US shift to Asia, 
the implementation of the Obama doctrine 
based on reduced engagement and leading from 
behind, and differences over critical issues like 
the Iran nuclear dossier and the Syrian conflict 
accentuated the distance between the Gulf and the 
US. This increased the Gulf ’s sense of unease in 
the face of multiple Middle Eastern challenges and 
contributed to strengthening the idea that security 
and the defence of vital interests now had to be 
taken in their own hands.    
II. THE GULF AND THE MENA REGION.
Against this backdrop, the MENA region became 
one of the main focuses of the Gulf countries’ 
international relations. Growing economic and 
investment interests and the intensification of 
financial flows, including aid and charity transfers, 
to Middle Eastern and North African countries, 
went together with an unprecedented effort to 
increase political and cultural influence there.
As this ebook has shown, the Arab Spring, with 
the ensuing changes and chaos, did nothing but 
accelerate Gulf penetration into the MENA region. 
Protecting the stability of the Gulf countries, 
which in the view of the ruling monarchies also 
meant shielding their regimes from the winds of 
political change sweeping the region, became the 
underlying objective of their regional policies, the 
one common goal on which all the GCC countries 
agreed and converged. 
Action by the GCC countries articulated into 
several areas of intervention. In the wake of the 
uprising in 2011-12, all the Gulf monarchies 
swiftly moved to guarantee domestic consensus 
and reduce grievances among their populations. 
They curbed nascent political opposition through 
economic handouts and co-optation of new social 
groups. At the same time, they began to play a 
more proactive role in the region. For instance, 
they provided economic support to Oman, 
Bahrain and other Arab monarchies (Morocco 
and Jordan) and to friendly regimes that had 
emerged from the post-Arab-Spring transition, 
such as the military government in Egypt; but 
they also became players in the post-Arab-Spring 
politics of many Arab countries, through funding 
or backing political and social forces amenable to 
Gulf interests and by sponsoring factionalism. 
At times, the GCC countries acted together as a 
regional grouping. There were attempts under 
Saudi leadership to strengthen GCC foreign 
and security policy co-ordination. Nevertheless, 
more often they moved as individual nations 
with different economic interests and divergent 
foreign policy agendas and objectives. The issue 
of the 2013-14 row between Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE on one side and Qatar on the other over the 
Muslim Brotherhood is a good case in point. This 
dispute pushed GCC solidarity to the limits and it 
took much pressure and many mediation efforts 
by the Saudis to convince Qatar to abandon its 
region-wide support of the Muslim Brothers.
Several of our ebook chapters have shown that, in a 
variety of cases, the new regional course undertaken 
by the Gulf countries is a combination of old 
and new concerns and policies. A fundamental 
concern about security and territorial integrity 
has always been a driving force behind the foreign 
policy of the oil-rich and scarcely-populated 
emirates and monarchies, which have had to face 
numerous regional threats since their foundation. 
Similarly, certain foreign policy objectives are 
long-standing. For example, contrasting Iran’s 
activism in the region and the use of proxies and 
clients to counter what are perceived as Iran’s 
attempts to establish its influence in the Gulf ’s 
immediate neighbourhood, supporting tribes in 
Yemen and elsewhere, salafi islamists throughout 
the region and sunni jihadist fighters in regional 
conflicts, and finally providing large financial 
The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challenges65
packages to support friendly countries are all good 
illustrations of tools that the Gulf countries have 
used in the past and that continue to be part of 
their policies in the MENA region.
The novelty is that both the real and the perceived 
threats have greatly multiplied in the post-Arab-
Spring era and now stem from the growing 
instability, power vacuums or state failure in 
neighbouring countries. 
As stressed in this ebook, the Gulf countries 
have felt increasingly encircled by what they see 
as proxy conflicts sponsored by Iran in Yemen, 
Iraq and Syria. They see Iran’s activities as the 
prism through which to read regional instability. 
Consequently, in the various crises in the region 
they have actively supported factions that could 
act as proxies in the geo-political confrontation 
with Iran. 
Because of its regional weight, history and 
political-religious role, the reaction to the threat 
from Iran has been different in Saudi Arabia and 
in the smaller GCC countries. Saudi Arabia has 
proposed itself as the leader of the Sunni camp 
in a context characterized by intensification of 
the sectarian confrontation opposing Sunnis and 
Shias. The origin of the cleavage is geo-political, 
not religious, but the exacerbation of the religious 
dimension can further deepen the divide, making 
it harder to find domestic political settlements 
or diplomatic solutions to the many crises in the 
region. 
The Iranian nuclear deal plays on the fundamental 
fears of Saudi Arabia and, as a consequence, of 
the other Gulf countries. It will allow the re-entry 
of Iran as a fully legitimate actor on the regional 
scene, while the end of sanctions will boost Iran’s 
economy and increase its military capabilities. 
These developments, if not managed carefully, risk 
further hardening Saudi responses.
The smaller Gulf emirates have higher economic 
and security stakes in their relations with Iran 
and have traditionally been more cautious in 
dealing with their neighbour across the water. The 
geopolitical confrontation with Iran, which the 
Saudis accuse of meddling in Arab affairs, and the 
ensuing polarization between Shias and Sunnis 
have brought about a re-alignment under Saudi 
Arabia leadership within the GCC, increasing the 
concern of the smaller GCC emirates that tensions 
might eventually lead to direct confrontation. 
The chaos that has followed the Arab uprising has 
also created a fertile ground for the expansion 
of transnational jihadist movements that put 
into question the very existence of post-colonial 
borders. In the case of the territories controlled 
by ISIS in Syria and Iraq, they have even started 
to dismantle them, at least rhetorically replacing 
nation states with the caliphate. After the Arab 
Spring, global jihadism has been on the rise in the 
region. Jihadist movements have taken advantage 
of the crisis of legitimacy and poor governance 
in a number of countries and have succeeded 
in establishing themselves as a ruling force in 
territories and cities in Sahel, Yemen, Iraq, Syria 
and Libya, creating links with tribes and groups 
opposed to the central states. This development 
is particularly dangerous for the Gulf countries. 
The intensification of the jihadist threat and 
the rise of ISIS increase the risk of a complete 
collapse of the region’s security order. Moreover, 
jihadism represents a domestic security threat as 
its political message resonates among sectors of 
the population, as is shown by the large number of 
Saudi fighters who have joined ISIS.
An additional element of novelty in the post-
Arab-Spring setting is the much-discussed new 
Gulf assertiveness on regional issues. The Gulf 
countries seem to have abandoned their long-
standing behind-the-scenes approach and appear 
willing to intervene directly in many situations. 
In Syria, Iraq and Libya, new and more proactive 
The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challenges66
Gulf strategies have gone hand in hand with a 
more audacious use of traditional foreign policy 
tools and with a higher profile in multilateral fora. 
The Saudi-led operation in Yemen epitomizes 
the great shift from the traditional war by proxy 
to a new interventionist stance. For the first time, 
a coalition led by Saudi Arabia has militarily 
intervened in a regional conflict, used airpower, 
and sent troops on the ground. As shown in 
the ebook, the intervention in Yemen aims to 
achieve long-term objectives in the country 
and to counter the alleged Iranian meddling. 
However, the intervention is not devoid of risks, 
and demonstrates the Saudi determination to be 
an active participant in the shaping of the new 
regional order. 
III. CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE 
As the ebook shows, these changes in the 
approach of Gulf foreign policies in the MENA 
region occur while new structural challenges cast 
some shadows over the future. The drop in oil 
prices, resulting from a global supply glut, is likely 
to be a lasting phenomenon and to reduce Gulf 
country revenues for some time to come. Painful 
economic reforms and important adaptations in 
their development and diversification strategies 
cannot be put off any longer. The Gulf countries 
will be forced to eliminate waste and subsidies, 
reduce infrastructural investments and introduce 
important structural reforms, while maintaining 
redistributive economic policies that are 
essential to keep their peoples’ allegiance to the 
regimes. Similarly, the demographic structure 
of GCC countries and the shortcomings of their 
immigration policies might negatively affect 
growth prospects in the long run. 
While the presence of large financial reserves 
should avoid a hard landing for the GCC 
economies and dispel any immediate threat to the 
sustainability of the Gulf model, the new economic 
situation might increase the risk of instability and 
make interventionist policies more difficult to 
implement. It remains to be seen, for instance, 
what kind of impact the cost of the war in Yemen 
will have on the Saudi and Gulf economies and, 
consequently, on the domestic political dynamics. 
In sum, the Gulf countries might have to face a 
scenario characterized by domestic stagnation, 
uncertainties and difficult dilemmas in foreign 
policy, while the situation in the MENA region 
does not show any sign of improvements.
IV. WHAT IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EU?
The changes in Gulf status and policies highlighted 
in this ebook have important implications for the 
Middle East and beyond. How should the EU 
react? What should the EU response to the new 
role of the Gulf in the international and regional 
arenas be? 
The 1988 EU-GCC Co-operation Agreement – 
which is the basis of the relationship between the 
two blocks – gives emphasis to region-to-region 
ties and focuses mainly on economic issues and 
co-operation in areas such as energy, industry, 
trade and services, science and technology, 
and the environment. Over the years, the EU-
GCC relationship has borne limited fruits. The 
prolonged focus on the now-deadlocked FTA 
negotiations produced frustration on both sides 
and has been detrimental to the development 
of a more multifaceted relationship. Currently, 
bilateral ties between EU and GCC member states 
are much stronger than the region-to-region ones. 
EU co-operation has made only limited 
achievements. The Gulf model and economic 
diversification efforts aim at building a knowledge-
based economy, with heavy investment in research 
and development, higher education and centres of 
excellence. Moreover, structural and public sector 
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reforms are made even more urgent by the current 
negative economic cycle. In this framework, 
deepening the exchanges and cooperation 
between the GCC and the EU would be extremely 
valuable, and there are several areas – from higher 
education to research, from environment to 
clean energy – where the two sides could benefit 
from joint initiatives, partnerships and synergies. 
People-to-people initiatives could increase mutual 
knowledge and create better understanding, thus 
benefiting EU-GCC business and political ties. 
The political aspects of the relationship are still 
under-developed. Calls to intensify the political 
dialogue, for instance to co-ordinate policy 
responses to regional crises, have resulted in 
limited increases in contacts, with the exception 
of the case of Yemen in 2011-12, where the EU 
supported the GCC peace initiative and its (now-
suspended) implementation. Human rights have 
been a divisive issue and attempts to start an EU-
GCC dialogue in this area have brought no results. 
Given the changes and challenges affecting the 
Gulf and the surrounding MENA region, it 
would be short-sighted for the EU to keep the 
relationship at the current minimalist levels. As we 
have seen in this ebook, the GCC is now a global 
player which is re-orientating its international and 
economic relations towards Asia and is adopting 
a new proactive and at times controversial stance 
in the crisis-ridden MENA region. The EU has a 
strategic interest in revisiting its relationship with 
the GCC and its members. Engaging with the Gulf 
countries should serve the purpose of increasing 
convergence on regional issues. The EU and the 
Gulf countries should find common ground on 
how to deal with regional threats, to dispel the 
fears – like, for instance, on the issue of the Iran 
nuclear agreement – which impede the reduction 
of tension and the stabilisation of the region. They 
should look for synergies and a positive division of 
labour in handling the regional crises, to increase 
the chance of success of mediation and conflict-
resolution efforts.
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